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Abstract
Detection and Classification of Malicious Processes Using System Call Analysis
Raymond J. Canzanese, Jr.
Moshe Kam, Ph.D. and Spiros Mancoridis, Ph.D.
Despite efforts to mitigate the malware threat, the proliferation of malware continues, with record-
setting numbers of malware samples being discovered each quarter. Malware are any intentionally
malicious software, including software designed for extortion, sabotage, and espionage. Traditional
malware defenses are primarily signature-based and heuristic-based, and include firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, and antivirus software. Such defenses are reactive, performing well against known
threats but struggling against new malware variants and zero-day threats. Together, the reactive
nature of traditional defenses and the continuing spread of malware motivate the development of
new techniques to detect such threats. One promising set of techniques uses features extracted from
system call traces to infer malicious behaviors.
This thesis studies the problem of detecting and classifying malicious processes using system
call trace analysis. The goal of this study is to identify techniques that are ‘lightweight’ enough
and exhibit a low enough false positive rate to be deployed in production environments. The major
contributions of this work are (1) a study of the effects of feature extraction strategy on malware
detection performance; (2) the comparison of signature-based and statistical analysis techniques
for malware detection and classification; (3) the use of sequential detection techniques to identify
malicious behaviors as quickly as possible; (4) a study of malware detection performance at very
low false positive rates; and (5) an extensive empirical evaluation, wherein the performance of the
malware detection and classification systems are evaluated against data collected from production
hosts and from the execution of recently discovered malware samples. The outcome of this study is a
proof-of-concept system that detects the execution of malicious processes in production environments
and classifies them according to their similarity to known malware.

1Chapter 1: Introduction
Malware, short for ‘malicious software’, are any software with an intentionally malicious function.
Malware are used for espionage, extortion, and sabotage, and used to perform other unauthorized
tasks. Such tasks include sending unwanted email messages (spam) and participating in distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Malware exist in various forms, including embedded malware,
mobile malware, malicious scripts, and malicious bytecode. This study seeks to identify the execu-
tion of standalone binary executable malware files (i.e., malware samples) in traditional computing
environments (e.g., servers, workstations, laptops, and notebooks). A computer host is considered
‘infected’ if it has executed any known malware samples. Otherwise, it is considered ‘clean’.
In this chapter, Section 1.1 provides a summary of common malware functions and delivery
mechanisms, taditional malware defenses, and recent malware trends. Sections 1.2–1.3 introduce
behavioral malware analysis and system call tracing. Section 1.4 describes the motivations for
and challenges in performing behavioral malware analysis online, and Section 1.5 emphasizes the
importance of empirical evaluation. Section 1.6 summarizes the research contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Malware
Malware are traditionally characterized by their malicious functions, delivery mechanisms, and au-
thorship or heritage. The following categories describe common malicious functions.
Backdoors
Backdoors provide clandestine remote access to an infected host, typically bypassing normal
authentication and security mechanisms.
Bots
Bots enable remote control of a host. The infected hosts are typically part of a network of
infected hosts, referred to as a botnet. Bots are used for performing distributed operations,
such as sending spam, mining crypto-currency, or performing DDoS attacks [1, 2].
2Downloaders and droppers
Downloaders and droppers install additional malware on infected hosts. Downloaders download
additional malware from remote servers, while droppers are bundled with additional malware.
Ransomware
Ransomware restrict access to a host, by disabling or hiding normal functions, or by encrypting
or hiding data. Ransomware are typically used to extort money from affected users [3].
Rootkits
Rootkits covertly provide persistent and privileged access to a host. Rootkits typically hide
processes, hide files, and interfere with security software to evade detection.
Scareware
Scareware use fear to sell a typically useless product. For example, rogue antivirus (AV)
software erroneously report malware infections and are used to sell the service removing the
reported infections [4].
Spyware
Spyware steal private user information, such as financial data, browsing habits, license keys,
and login credentials. Spyware typically transmit the stolen information to a remote server.
Malware are also characterized by their delivery mechanisms, the methods by which they spread to
and infect new hosts. The following malware categories describe common delivery mechanisms [5].
Exploits
Exploits take advantage of software vulnerabilities to enable privileged execution of malware.
Logic bombs
Logic bombs are malicious functions embedded in otherwise benign software.
Trojan horses
Trojan horses, also known as Trojans, are malware disguised as legitimate software, used to
trick users into unknowingly installing malware.
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Viruses are self-replicating malware that insert code into other programs, files, or locations on
an infected host.
Worms
Worms are self-replicating malware that spread to other hosts, typically over a computer
network.
To maximize their effectiveness and evade defenses, malware samples typically include multiple
malicious functions and use multiple delivery mechanisms. As such, malware samples typically
exhibit characteristics of multiple categories.
1.1.1 Malware naming
No single, universal malware taxonomy or naming scheme exists. Instead, multiple naming schemes
have been developed by major security companies to identify malware samples. Such naming schemes
typically include a malware category label, which indicates the primary delivery mechanism and/or
malicious function of a malware sample, and a malware family label, which indicates specific shared
function, authorship, or heritage. Examples of malware families include Zeus/Zbot, Flame, Stuxnet,
Duqu, MyDoom, and Sality. Often, naming systems include a sub-family or variant label, indicated
by an alphanumeric identifier. Naming systems may also specify the target platform of a malware
sample or the language in which it is written.
The existence of malware samples that use multiple delivery mechanisms and perform multiple
malicious functions complicate the malware naming process. Although the functions and delivery
mechanisms listed in Section 1.1 are not mutually exclusive, malware naming schemes typically
indicate only the primary function or delivery mechanism of a sample. Existing malware naming
schemes suffer from two major drawbacks: incompleteness and inconsistency [6]. The naming
schemes are incomplete because there are known malware samples missing from each scheme. The
major challenges to creating a complete naming schemes are the number of existing malware samples
and frequency at which new malware samples are discovered. More than 50 million new malware
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4Table 1.1: Names assigned to two malware samples by five antivirus (AV) vendors
vendor sample A sample B
Microsoft PWS:Win32/Zbot PWS:Win32/Zbot.AEO
Kaspersky Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.tivt Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.crie
ESET Win32/Injector.BGXN None
McAfee Labs None Generic Dropper!1jk
Dr. Web Trojan.PWS.Panda.655 Trojan.PWS.Panda.655
samples were discovered in the fourth quarter of 2014 alone, an average of 6 new malware samples
every second. McAfee Labs projects to have more than 500 million total samples in their collection
by the end of 2015 [7].
Existing malware naming systems are inconsistent because different naming schemes do not
place malware samples consistently in the same category or family. One of the major challenges to
achieving consistent malware naming is the overlap in malware functions and delivery mechanisms.
Furthermore, malware samples are often composed of code derived from multiple different sources,
complicating the problem of establishing malware authorship or heritage. Finally, malware samples
are typically designed to complicate the types of analyses used to reveal their functions, delivery
mechanisms, authorship, and heritage. Techniques used by malware authors to complicate such
analyses include obfuscation, packing, encryption, anti-debugging, anti-disassembly, and other anti-
analysis techniques [8].
The inconsistency and incompleteness of malware naming schemes are demonstrated in Table 1.1
The table shows the names assigned to two malware samples by five different AV vendors, Microsoft1,
Kaspersky2, ESET3, McAfee4, and Dr. Web5. The names are presented in the formats provided by
the vendor. The incompleteness of the naming schemes is demonstrated by the missing name for
sample A from McAfee and the missing name for sample B from ESET. The inconsistency of the
naming schemes is demonstrated through a comparison of the labels assigned by each vendor. For
example, Microsoft identifies both samples as distinct variants belonging to the password stealer
1Microsoft Malware Protection Center (MMPC), http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/mmpc/
2Kaspersky Lab, www.kaspersky.com
3ESET NOD32, www.eset.com
4McAfee Labs, http://www.mcafee.com
5Dr. Web, www.drweb.com
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5(PWS) category and Zeus/Zbot family. Dr. Web similarly identifies the samples as being members
of the PWS category and from the same family, but does not differentiate between the two samples.
Kaspersky identifies the samples as belonging to two distinct categories, Trojan-Spy and Trojan-
Dropper, and two distinct families, Zbot/Zeus and Injector.
1.1.2 Malware delivery mechanisms
Malware primarily infect hosts through the exploitation of security vulnerabilities, through the ex-
ploitation of lax security practices, and through social engineering. Security vulnerabilities are used
by malware authors to enable privileged malware execution. These include input validation, code in-
jection, buffer overflow, privilege escalation, and cross-site scripting vulnerabilities [9]. While many
vulnerabilities are discovered and patched by the authors of affected software, others are discovered
and exploited by an attacker before the vulnerabilities are known. Such vulnerabilities, known as
zero-day vulnerabilities, are particularly worrisome for commonly used software, as they enable mal-
ware authors to successfully infect many vulnerable hosts. Furthermore, malware exploiting zero
day vulnerabilities can spread largely unchecked until the exploited vulnerabilities are discovered
and patched.
Malware targeting hosts with lax security typically seek easy targets, such as hosts with weak
passwords. For example, some malware scan computer networks for hosts running common network
services. The malware attempt to access the discovered services by performing dictionary attacks
with common username and password combinations.
Social engineering is the use of disguises, ploys, or tricks to convince a user to unknowingly assist
an attacker in infecting a host [10]. One common social engineering tactic is the use of Trojan horses
to trick users into downloading and installing malware. For example, the Zeus/Zbot malware family
has been used in targeted email campaigns, sent to potential victims as electronic greeting cards
from the White House, Federal Trade Commission complaints, and shipping invoices.
Of these three delivery mechanisms, the exploitation of security vulnerabilities is comparatively
rare. This is largely due to the engineering effort required to identify exploitable security vulnera-
bilities. When vulnerabilities are discovered, they are typically sold on the black market to be used
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6in cyber-attacks [11]. Furthermore, exploits are only useful as long as the targeted vulnerabilities
remain open [12]. Conversely, social engineering requires only a sufficiently convincing ploy to trick
targeted users, and the discovery of computer hosts with lax security is easily automated.
1.1.3 Malware motivations
Malware authors are motivated by a number of factors, including politics, ideologies, and mone-
tary gain. Politically and ideologically motivated malware are increasingly being used as parts of
sophisticated, targeted attacks known as advanced persistent threats (APTs) [11]. APTs typically
use multiple delivery mechanisms to gain access to a target’s computer systems. Examples of APTs
include Stuxnet, used for sabotage at an Iranian nuclear facility [13], and Operation Aurora, used
for corporate espionage [14].
Malware are also particularly useful as profit source. Some malware, such as Zeus/Zbot, are sold
in the form of crimeware kits used for creating customized malware samples [15]. Malware authors
also sell access to botnets, which are typically used to provide phishing and spam services, to mine
crypto-currency, and to perform DDoS attacks [16]. Spyware are used to steal sensitive data, such
as user credentials and financial data, which are sold in the black market [17]. Ransomware and
scareware are used to extort money from the users of infected hosts [4].
1.1.4 Malware defenses
Traditional defenses against malware include the adoption of secure computing practices, the design
of more secure systems, and the use of security-related software tools. Secure computing practices
include
• keeping software up-to-date to mitigate the chance of known vulnerabilities being exploited [4];
• safeguarding private information against casual reconnaissance; and
• adopting security policies to reduce the number of possible attack vectors on a host.
Teaching secure computing practices to end-users is an especially important step in preventing
intrusions enabled by lax security practices, slowing the proliferation of Trojan horses, reducing the
success of phishing attempts, and thwarting other attempts at social engineering [18, 19].
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a field known as trusted computing [20]. Techniques used in trusted computing include protecting
sensitive information at the hardware-level and signing code so users can verify whether it comes
from a trusted source. Recent malware trends indicate that malware authors have begun digitally
signing their malware to avoid detection by such mechanisms. McAfee reports nearly 16 million
distinct signed malware samples have been discovered through the beginning of 2015 [7].
Software tools used to protect against malware infections include intrusion detection systems
(IDSs) and AV software. IDSs are used to detect malware and other malicious intrusions. Host IDSs
detect intrusions at the host-level, by monitoring operating system (OS) interaction, file access, and
audit data [21, 22]. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) detect intrusions at the network
level, by monitoring network traffic. IDSs can be signature-based, detecting intrusions based on
patterns of known attacks [23], or anomaly-based, detecting intrusions by identifying deviations
from normal behavior [24, 25].
AV software typically identify files as either benign or malicious by comparing them against a
database of byte signatures of known malware [5]. The strengths of AV software are that they provide
a low false positive rate (FPR) and have easily provable and quantifiable performance against known
malware samples. However, the weakness of signature-based AV software is that they are reactive,
typically requiring new malware to be discovered and analyzed prior to detection. Furthermore, AV
software to fail to detect new malware variants that have been modified just enough to not match any
existing signatures. In response, AV software incorporate heuristic techniques to identify common
types of malware, and signatures are designed to detect as many variants of a malware sample
as possible. Techniques for streamlining malware analysis and reducing the number of required
signatures are of particular interest to AV vendors [7, 26].
1.1.5 Recent malware trends
To evade detection by AV software, malware authors generate new malware variants by reordering,
encrypting, recompiling, compressing, padding, or otherwise changing malware samples without
altering their function [8]. Such changes can be applied automatically using specialized software,
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8such as encrypters and packers. Certain types of malware modify themselves automatically as
they propagate. Polymorphic viruses mutate by re-encrypting critical parts of themselves, while
metamorphic viruses mutate by changing their own code structure as they propagate [27, 28]. As
malware authors have become more savvy at creating new malware variants, the burden on AV
vendors to create signatures to detect all of the variants has increased. The time it takes for AV
software to detect a new malware sample varies from a few days to many months [29].
New malware variants can be released over the course of many months or years. For example,
the Zeus/Zbot malware family was first discovered in 2007. In 2010, more than 90,000 new, distinct
variants were discovered [11]. More than 8 years after its introduction, new variants of Zeus/Zbot
continue to be discovered. Another popular technique for releasing malware variants is the variant
flood attack. In a variant flood attack, tens of thousands of variants are released in rapid succession.
The goal of such an attack is to overwhelm AV vendors, who struggle to quickly analyze and generate
signatures for all of the variants [30].
Computing infrastructure continues to grow in both size and complexity, as illustrated by recent
trends such as the emergence of cloud computing and ultra large scale (ULS) systems [31]. This
increase in complexity introduces new security vulnerabilities, while simultaneously complicating
the detection of malware-based cyber-attacks. The combined effects of the increasing prevalence
and sophistication of malware, the vulnerability of traditional AV software to malware variants, and
the increasing complexity of computing infrastructure, motivate the development of techniques to
detect the malware samples that evade traditional defenses. Among the most promising techniques
are those from behavioral malware analysis, described in the following section.
1.2 Behavioral malware analysis
Among the techniques proposed to address the weaknesses of traditional malware detection methods
are those based on dynamic analysis or behavioral analysis. In behavioral analysis, observed charac-
teristics of executing software are used to detect the presence of malware. Behavioral characteristics
are a desirable source of information, since they are typically unaffected by the obfuscations used
to evade traditional AV software. One of the major challenges in designing a behavioral malware
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• can be used to differentiate between malware and benign software;
• can be used to differentiate among different families and categories of malware;
• are robust to differences in benign functions, configurations, workloads, and usage patterns;
• are difficult for malware authors to obfuscate; and
• are easily observable in the target environment.
The first two criteria focus on the discriminability afforded by the characteristics, i.e., whether
they contain enough information to detect and classify malware. Not only must the characteristics
provide dicrimination, they must must also afford high detection rates at very low false positive rates
(FPRs) [32]. The FPR of a malware detector is especially important because of the relatively low
incidence of malware infections when compared to the number of events that a malware detector
observes. How the FPR of a detector is characterized depends on the type of detector. For AV
software, the FPR might be characterized as the fraction of all benign files that are incorrectly
identified as malware [33]. For an IDS, the FPR might be characterized as the fraction of observed
events misclassified as malicious. The FPR of a detector can also be characterized as the average
time between false positives.
The third criterion focuses on the robustness of the chosen characteristics. To be applicable to a
wide variety use-cases, the characteristics should be unaffected by differences among benign systems,
such as host and software configurations. The chosen characteristics should also be unaffected by
benign changes in workload or usage patterns.
The fourth criterion focuses on the robustness of the characteristics in terms of the estimated
level of effort required for obfuscation. In the case of static signature-based detection, the required
level of effort is low. Malware authors employ an automated process of generating new variants and
comparing them against the latest available AV signatures. Variants that are undetected are deemed
suitable for deployment. If appropriate behavioral characteristics are chosen for detection, there is
no longer a simple, well-defined obfuscation process to evade detection. The challenge for malware
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authors changes from the relatively easy changing of the structure of a static file to evade detection,
to the comparatively more difficult altering of the behavioral characteristics of a program while
maintaining its malicious function. The most successful type of attack against a behavioral malware
detector would likely be a mimicry attack. In a mimicry attack, malware samples are designed to
behave more like benign software to evade detection [34]. Shadow attacks are another possible type
of attack, wherein malicious behaviors are divided among multiple processes [35]. Such attacks are
successful against process-level system call signature detectors when crafted to obfuscate specific
detection signatures. The selected behavioral characteristics must be difficult for malware authors
to obfuscate while maintaining malicious functionality.
The final criterion concerns the observability of the chosen characteristics on the target platform.
First, observation of the chosen characteristics must be feasible on the target platform to even be
considered. For example, the entire control flow graph of software program may be useful for
characterizing software function and detecting malware. However, such information is difficult to
reliably extract, limiting its practical applicability [36]. Second, the desired characteristics may be
observable, but the costs associated with extracting the required information may be prohibitive.
For example, an accounting of all of information flow through a host may be useful for identifying
privacy-breaching malware. However, the overhead introduced by monitoring the information flow
is very high, precluding its use in complex production systems [37]. The problem of selecting the
appropriate characteristics to use for behavioral malware detection is addressed in Chapter 4.
1.3 System call tracing
One particularly promising source of behavioral characteristics for malware detection are system call
traces. A system call trace is a detailed accounting of the system calls occurring on a host. System
calls are a mechanism used by software programs to request OS services. In the Microsoft Windows
family of OSs, the set of all 465 system calls (although not officially documented) can be partitioned
into the following categories [38],
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• atoms (for string manipulation),
• boot configuration,
• debugging,
• device driver control,
• environment settings,
• error handling,
• files and general input/output (I/O),
• jobs,
• local procedure calls (LPCs),
• memory management,
• miscellaneous,
• object management,
• plug and play,
• power management,
• process and thread management,
• processor information,
• registry access,
• security functions,
• synchronization, and
• timers.
System call traces are of interest for malware detection because they provide information about
how executing software interact with a host OS. In particular, system call-based malware detection
works under the assumption that the function of a program can be coarsely determined by observing
its system call trace [39]. This assumption applies to malware because their malicious functions
(described in Section 1.1) require the use of OS services. A major challenge in system-call based
malware detection is the determination of feature set to extract from system call traces that satisfies
the criteria described in Section 1.2.
The relative ease of obtaining system call traces also makes them a desirable source of information
for malware detection. Traces can be obtained using the strace program or auditd framework in
Linux, or the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) framework in Windows. A system call trace is
typically a log of two types of events, system call enters and system call exits. System call enter
events typically include information about the processor from which a system call originates and
the data passed as input to the call. System call exit events typically include the data returned
by a system call. The rate of system calls on a host varies based on processor speed, number of
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Figure 1.1: Example system call trace showing the first 30 calls made by a web browser process
processor cores, and type and intensity of computational load. On the hosts used in this study, the
rate at which system calls are made ranged from hundreds of system calls per second to hundreds
of thousands of system calls per second.
Another advantage to using system call tracing for malware detection is that system call traces
can be collected in real-time on production hosts. By logging only a subset of the data – e.g., by
ignoring input arguments, ignoring returned data, sampling the data, or aggregating the data – the
memory, processing, and storage overhead required for system call tracing can be tuned to enable
live data collection and processing.
Figure 1.1 shows an example system call trace in the format used for this study. It is a process-
level trace of a web browser, beginning when the web browser process was created. It shows the
system calls made by the web browser process in the order in which the corresponding system call
enter events were observed. Only the first thirty system calls of the trace are presented for brevity.
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This system call format is advantageous because the sequence of system calls depicted in Figure 1.1
can be concisely encoded and stored for later analysis. Such system call traces can be collected at
multiple different levels, including the host, application, process, and thread levels.
1.4 Detecting and classifying unknown malware samples
Section 1.1.4 identified two types of malware against which traditional defenses struggle, i.e., new
malware samples and new variants of existing malware samples. Such malware are typically free
to perform their malicious tasks until they are discovered. Even if the security vulnerabilities or
lapses that led to the infection are corrected, or the processes where the infection originated are
terminated, the malware samples typically have already gained privileged access to the host and
will remain active. Such samples are discovered by users or administrators who observe abnormal
behavior that can be attributed to the malware infection. The discovery of such malware infections
is not straightforward, as many malware samples are designed to hide their presence.
Historically, malware infections were identifiable through obvious indicators, such as degradation
of system performance, excessive network traffic, excessive hard drive access, or frequent crashes. As
malware become more sophisticated and focused on stealth, characteristics traditionally associated
with malware infection have become less pronounced. For example, three malware families – Stuxnet,
Flame, and Duqu – ran undetected in production environments for over a year before they were
discovered [13, 40–42]. Such malware samples serve as motivating examples for this study.
The goal of this study is to establish a set of techniques for identifying malicious processes,
especially those resulting from the execution of new malware samples and malware variants that
evade traditional defenses. Furthermore, the goal is to detect such infections as quickly as possible,
to limit the adverse effects of the malware. The three primary components of this thesis are the
study of the problems of feature extraction, malware detection, and malware classification.
Feature extraction
The objective of feature extraction is to identify a set of features that can be extracted from system
call traces and that satisfy the criteria described in Section 1.2. The extraction of the selected
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features must be simple enough that it can be performed in real-time on production hosts. This
study uses frequency information about localized patterns of system calls as its primary feature set.
The data are extracted using information retrieval techniques inspired by document classification.
This study also seeks to identify the smallest set of features to use for detection. Using the smallest
possible set of features serves to reduce the memory and computational overhead of the system and
to avoid the adverse effects of detector and classifier overfitting.
Malware detection
The objective of malware detection is to establish a set of techniques for detecting malware exe-
cution in real-time on production hosts. This work compares the empirical detection performance
of signature-based and statistical anomaly-based detection techniques that are ‘lightweight’ enough
to be used in production environments. The techniques are evaluated against system call traces
collected from production environments and from the execution of recently discovered malware sam-
ples. Emphasis is placed on characterizing detector performance at very low FPRs and on performing
detection as quickly as possible using sequential detection techniques.
Malware classification
The goal of the malware classification is to establish a set of techniques to classify new malware
samples based on their behavioral similarity to known malware. Classification results provide insight
into the damage caused by detected malware samples and possible paths for mitigation. The focus
of this study is on classification techniques that use the same behavioral features as the detector.
The techniques studied in this thesis can be applied to classify malware samples immediately as they
are detected, without requiring any additional data collection.
1.5 The importance of empirical evaluation
To be useful in production environments, a malware detection system must exhibit a high detection
rate at an acceptably low FPR [32]. Furthermore, detection performance must be quantified in
environments representative of those in which the system is likely to be deployed, or preferably
quantified using data collected from the target environments [43].
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The requirement to evaluate proposed detection and classification results in representative en-
vironments precludes the use of specialized sandbox environments. Sandbox environments provide
detailed information about software execution, including filesystem, registry, process, and system
call activity [44]. However, sandbox environments typically limit execution paths and provide a
limited view of software function [45]. Thus, data collected from such environments are typically
not representative of data collected from production environments.
A major component of this thesis is the empirical evaluation and comparison of the described
feature extraction, malware detection, and malware classification techniques. This study used a
custom host-agent to collect system call traces from production hosts running 32-bit and 64-bit
versions of Windows 7 and 8, and Windows Server 2008 (R2) and 2012 (R2). A custom malware
testbed was used to inject recently discovered malware samples onto live hosts. The empirical
evaluation considered more than 55,000 malware samples first discovered between January 2012 and
March 2015 and 4 million system call traces collected from 43 hosts. In total, more than 1,000
host-days of data collected between October 2014 and March 2015 were used for the experimental
evaluation of the described techniques.
1.6 Research contributions and thesis outline
The preceding sections introduced three key challenges in behavioral malware detection and classi-
fication, including
• feature extraction from system call traces,
• rapid detection of malicious processes at a low FPR, and
• classification of detected malware using only the features available at detection time.
The remaining chapters of this thesis address these three challenges, describing a system for detecting
the execution of malicious processes on production computer hosts. The system, depicted in the
block diagram in Figure 1.2, uses a custom host-agent to track the system call traces of every
process executing on a host. From the traces, it extracts numerical feature data that are used by
the detector to provide binary decisions indicating whether a process is benign or malicious. If
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Figure 1.2: Block diagram of malware detection and classification system
the detector identifies suspected malware, the classifier determines the most likely category and/or
family to which the malware belong. The specific configuration of the system is determined through
experimental evaluation of multiple feature extraction, detection, and classification strategies.
The primary differences between this work and the related literature are presented in Chapter
2. Chapter 3 describes the design and deployment of the data collection host-agent. Chapter 4
provides a detailed overview of the feature extraction process. Chapter 5 examines the performance
afforded by four detection techniques. Sequential detection techniques are also explored to provide
a continuous monitoring scheme for malware detection and to provide more rapid detection results
than are afforded by fixed sample-size tests. Through experimental evaluation, the feature extraction
strategies, detection algorithms, and sequential detection strategies that provide the best detection
performance are identified. The selected strategies are used in a case study to test the detection
system’s performance against an independent data set collected from public computer laboratories.
Chapter 6 describes five classification strategies for identifying the category and family of detected
malware samples based on their behavioral similarity to known malware. It compares the accuracy of
the classifiers using 27 ground truth labeling schemes derived from AV labels. Chapter 7 concludes
with a summary and discussion of the experimental results, the resulting design of a behavioral
malware detection and classification system, and the implications of this study.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
This chapter presents a review of the related work in malware detection and classification, with a
focus on behavioral analysis techniques developed to address the shortcomings of traditional defenses.
Additional related work can be found in surveys by Idika and Mathur [46], and by Egele, Scholte,
Kirda, and Kruegel [44]. A detailed discussion and comparison of commercial antivirus (AV) software
can be found in a survey by Sukwong, Kim, and Hoe [29].
2.1 Malware detection
The related work in malware detection seeks to identify techniques that are more robust than existing
byte signature and heuristic techniques popular among AV software. The proposed techniques
include static analysis techniques, in which features are extracted from static files, and dynamic
analysis techniques, in which features are extracted from executing software.
2.1.1 Static analysis techniques
Static analysis techniques use features of static files to identify potential malware. Early work in
static analysis focused on byte code analysis, using data mining and machine learning instead of tra-
ditional signature generation techniques [47]. Entropy-based byte code analysis techniques have also
been proposed to detect packed, encrypted, or embedded malware [48]. Other useful static features
include the strings, file headers, imported libraries, and calls to external application programming
interface (API) functions present in a static executable file [49–51]. Even the approximate authorship
dates of the functions composing a program are useful features for malware detection [52].
Control flow information is also useful for malware detection. For example, formal semantics can
be used to describe common malicious behaviors in terms of their control flow, and the resulting
models can be used to detect semantically equivalent code [53, 54]. Other approaches use control
flow information to detect computer worms [55], web browser spyware [56], and metamorphic mal-
ware [57–59]. However, techniques for detecting semantically equivalent code have demonstrated to
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be effective only against specific obfuscations [60]. Furthermore, static analysis techniques relying
on relatively high-level features – such as control flow graphs – are limited by the difficulty of ex-
tracting the required information. Such techniques typically require malware first be unpacked and
disassembled [61]. Unfortunately, malware are often encrypted, compressed, or otherwise designed
specifically to complicate such analyses [36].
2.1.2 Dynamic analysis techniques
Dynamic analysis techniques have been widely studied as a means of addressing the shortcomings
of static analysis techniques. One such technique, taint analysis, identifies malicious behaviors by
tracking information flow [45, 62–66]. Taint analysis is particularly useful for identifying privacy-
breaching malware. It works by monitoring access to sensitive data and identifying potentially
malicious use of such data. However, its computational overhead, high false positive rate (FPR),
and vulnerability to relatively simple countermeasures limit its practical applicability [37, 67].
Other dynamic analysis techniques use data collected from hardware performance counters, which
provide information about processor usage, such as cache misses and branch predictions [68, 69].
Software performance monitors, such as those that report CPU, memory, network, and application-
specific resource usage information, are also useful features for malware detection [70–72]. Sensors
specific to the Java Virtual Machine have also been used to detect the execution of malicious Java
code [73]. Other techniques mine audit data [74] or monitor registry and filesystem operations [75]
for indicators of malware infections.
2.1.3 System call analysis
System call traces (described in Section 1.3) have been a popular source of information for dynamic
malware detection. The use of system call traces for malware detection originated in intrusion detec-
tion, where abnormal system call sequences were flagged as evidence of potential intrusions [22, 39].
System call-based malware detection has been approached using both signature-based and statisti-
cal techniques. Signature-based techniques seek to identify system call patterns unique to malware
samples, while statistical techniques seek models to describe benign and malicious behaviors.
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Table 2.1: Summary of related work in system call-based malware detection
Strategy Features Detection Evaluation
Forrest et al. [39] call sequences signatures intrusion detection
Hofmeyr et al. [22] call sequences signatures intrusion detection
Warrender et al. [76] call sequences, call
frequency
HMM, rule
learner
intrusion detection
Liao and Vemuri [77] call frequency nearest neighbor intrusion detection
Kang et al. [78] call frequency SVM, LR, na¨ıve
Bayes, decision
tree, rule learner
intrusion detection
Xin and Xu [79] call sequences Markov models,
temporal differ-
ence learning
intrusion detection
Burguera et al. [80] call frequency clustering 3 benign,
5 malicious
(3 self-written)
Martignoni et al. [65] activities graph matching 11 benign,
7 malicious
Tokhtabayev et al. [81] activities signatures 210 benign,
31 malicious
Mehdi et al. [82] call sequences rule learner,
SVM, decision
tree
72 benign,
72 malicious
Kirda et al. [56] activities signatures 18 benign,
33 malicious
Kolbitsch et al. [83] data flow graph matching 5 benign,
563 malicious
(6 families)
Pfoh et al. [84] call sequences SVM 285 benign,
1943 malicious
Xiao and Stibor [85] call sequences latent Dirichlet
allocation
168 benign,
2880 malicious
Canali et al. [43] {sequences, tuples,
bags} of {calls, ac-
tivities, arguments}
signatures 363k benign,
7k malicious
Lanzi et al. [75] call sequences,
activities
signatures 362k benign
(242 applications),
10k malicious
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A summary of the related work in system call analysis for malware detection is provided in
Table 2.1. The table presents the primary feature sets and detection algorithms used in each study,
along with a concise summary of the data used for experimental evaluation. The majority of the
works use system call sequences and frequencies as feature sets. Others argue system calls to be too
low-level, instead considering high-level activities extracted from system call traces. Such activities
included filesystem and registry changes, library interactions, and process creation and deletion
events. For detection, signature-based approaches are popular due to their white-box models and low
computational complexity during detection. Other approaches include the use of machine learning
and graph matching algorithms. Graph matching algorithms are used to compare the control flow
or data flow of a program to models of known benign and malicious behaviors. Such techniques
are intended to address the shortcomings of signature-based techniques, namely that they do not
generalize well to detecting unknown malware.
The approaches presented in Table 2.1 are partitioned into three groups, indicated by the hori-
zontal lines in the table. The studies in the first group [22, 39, 76–79] use system call trace data for
intrusion detection. These studies focus primarily on system call sequences and system call frequen-
cies as feature sets, using machine learning algorithms for detection. The techniques are evaluated
against system call traces of a small collection of Unix program, obtained under normal operating
conditions and during suspected intrusions.
The studies in the second group [56, 65, 80–85] use system call trace data for malware detection.
Like the intrusion detection work in the first group, a subset of these techniques use system call
sequences and frequencies for detection. Other feature sets derived from system call traces are also
considered, including models of malicious and benign activities [56], and data flow among system
calls [83]. The table indicates the quantity of benign and malicious software samples used for the
experimental evaluation of these techniques.
The studies in the third group [43, 75] also use system call trade data for malware detection. The
two studies in this group are set apart by their experimental evaluation. Whereas the studies in the
second group consider only a few malware samples or benign programs, the studies in the third group
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consider thousands of malware samples and hundreds of thousands of traces of benign programs from
multiple hosts. Lanzi et al. [75] use system call signatures for detection, concluding that such an
approach is inadequate for malware detection. Instead, they present a system-centric approach that
uses models of filesystem and registry activities for detection. Canali et al. [43] take a signature-based
approach, using system calls, their arguments, and derived activities for malware detection. The
authors explore the use of contiguous sequences (sequences), non-contiguous sequences (tuples), and
unordered occurrences (bags) of calls and activities for detection. The results of this work indicate
that there is no closed form expression to describe the effects of model selectivity or specificity on
detection accuracy, underscoring the importance of experimental evaluation.
2.2 Malware classification
Malware classification is the process of determining to which class a particular malware sample be-
longs. Classes can be malware categories, families, subfamilies, or any other malware groupings.
Automatic classification can help guide malware analysis by providing information about the ori-
gin, authorship, or function of a malware sample. In live environments, classification is useful for
determining appropriate mitigation strategies and guiding post-mortem analysis. A large portion
of related work in malware classification focuses primarily on systems designed for off-line analysis.
Such work is motivated in part by the need to expedite the analysis of and signature creation for
newly discovered malware samples. The related work in malware classification includes both static
and dynamic analysis techniques.
2.2.1 Static analysis techniques
The feature sets used for static classification mirror those used in static detection, including
• strings, byte sequences, and program structure [47, 86, 87];
• API imports, calls, and call sequences [88]; and
• control flow information [89–91].
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The classification algorithms used for static malware classification are primarily machine learning
techniques. Commonly used classification algorithms include
• na¨ıve Bayes, decision trees, and support vector machines (SVMs) [47, 87];
• image classification techniques [86];
• hierarchical clustering analysis [88]; and
• graph matching and clustering algorithms [89–91].
2.2.2 Dynamic analysis techniques
Dynamic classification techniques typically require malware samples be executed in a specialized
analysis environment. Such environments, including Anubis [92] and cwsandbox [93], provide reports
that include information about loaded libraries and other resources; file and registry activities (files
and keys created, read, written, and deleted); memory activities (regions read and written); and
system call traces. Nearest neighbor techniques have been used to classify malware based on such
reports [93–95], with one study focusing on the problem of determining the best distance measure
to assess similarity [96]. Alternate machine learning algorithms have also been explored, including
na¨ıve Bayes, SVM, decision trees, and neural networks [95]. Hierarchical clustering analysis based
on file, registry, and process activity have also demonstrated promise [6]. Techniques have been
described for classifying specific subsets of malware, including malware that communicate over a
network [97, 98] and certain rootkits that use API hooks [99].
As with malware detection, a subset of the classification techniques also focus primarily on system
call analysis. For example, system call traces extracted using cwsandbox and nearest neighbor
techniques have demonstrated success in classifying malware [100, 101]. Other techniques have used
activities derived from system call traces and clustering algorithms to perform classification [102].
Two recent studies combined static and dynamic analysis techniques for malware classification.
Neugschwandtner et al. [26] use static analysis based on a variety of features – including byte
sequences, program structure, program headers, and AV labels – to cluster malware according to
predicted behaviors. Then, they use dynamic analysis to analyze malware behaviors and generate
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mitigation procedures. Anderson et al. [103] use SVMs and multiple static and dynamic data
sources – including byte sequences, op-codes, control flow graphs, instruction traces, and system
call sequences – for classification. These two studies leverage the strengths of static analysis (ease
of feature extraction) and dynamic analysis (richness of datasets) to perform malware classification.
2.3 Novelty of this thesis
This chapter explored the related work in malware analysis, describing feature sets and algorithms
used for malware detection and classification. Despite their differences, these techniques all exhibited
promising empirical accuracy against their respective datasets. This thesis seeks to address two
perceived shortcomings of the related work. First, the related work contains conflicting claims
regarding the effectiveness of feature sets, detection, and classification techniques. Second, the
related work lacks a study of detector performance at very low FPRs. This thesis also contributes
the design of an online detection system for malicious processes, a study of sequential detection
techniques for rapid malware detection, an extensive experimental evaluation, and the design of an
online classification system for malicious processes.
2.3.1 Addressing conflicting claims
Published results in malware detection contain conflicting claims. For example, signatures of system
call sequences have been declared both effective [39, 101] and ineffective [6, 75] for detecting malware.
Similarly, system call frequencies [78, 80] have been found effective for malware detection, while other
works advocate for more complex feature sets [79, 85]. These conflicting claims are at least partially
rooted in the use of different datasets for evaluation. Accordingly, this study compares the usefulness
of different types of features, including system call frequencies, ordered sequences of system calls,
and unordered tuples of system calls. This study also compares signature-based techniques and
statistical machine learning techniques for malware detection and classification. The techniques are
evaluated against a single set of system call traces collected from live computer hosts and recent
malware samples to ensure fair comparisons.
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2.3.2 Detector performance at low FPRs
For malware detectors to be practically useful, they must demonstrate high detection rates at very
low FPRs [32]. For the majority of the related work, few claims regarding detection accuracy at
very low FPRs or the general applicatbility of the proposed technuques can be made. This is due to
the relatively small sample sizes considered for experimental evaluation. The two exceptional cases
in the related work were from Canali et al. [43] and Lanzi et al. [75], who used in excess of 100,000
benign traces in their evaluation. Canali et al. [43] provided a characterization of detection rate
at a FPR of 10−2, and characterized certain models at lower FPRs (∼ 10−3). The experimental
evaluation presented in this thesis focuses on the detection accuracy achieved at a FPR of 10−5.
2.3.3 Online detection
The goal of this study is to detect and classify the malware that evade traditional defenses and
execute on production hosts. Particularly, this study focuses on techniques that are ‘lightweight’
enough to be deployed online in production environments. In this way, this study is similar to related
work in intrusion detection (see Section 2.1.3), but with a singular focus on malware detection. This
work intends to identify techniques for malware detection that will be useful in identifying other
types of intrusions as well.
2.3.4 Sequential detection
A major concern in online malware detection is detecting malware quickly enough to mitigate their
damaging effects. To address this concern, this thesis studies the application of sequential detection
techniques to malware detection. A subset of the related work applies sequential detection tech-
niques to network data for the detection of worms and other network-based attacks [25, 104–106]
and for the detection of multi-stage cyberattacks [79]. In contrast, this work focuses on the appli-
cation of sequential detection techniques at the process level. Here, processes undergo continuous
monitoring, wherein successive detector outputs are combined to provide accurate detection results
while minimizing the delay between infection and detection.
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2.3.5 Experimental evaluation
In the related work, the source of the system call traces used for experimental evaluation varied.
A common theme was the use of malware traces collected from specialized analysis environments.
Such sandbox environments limit execution paths, thereby offering a limited view of software func-
tionality [45]. Sandbox environments typically track only a fraction of the system calls available
in recent versions of Microsoft Windows. Another common theme was the use of benign process
traces collected using API hooking and system service descriptor table (SSDT) hooking in Microsoft
Windows XP [43, 75, 84, 85].
In contrast, this thesis focuses exclusively on system call traces obtained from live production
hosts. This includes the execution of recently discovered malware samples on live hosts configured
like those found in production environments. Executing malware on live hosts enables the malware
to behave more closely to how they would in a real-world environment. Furthermore, doing so
reduces the risk of biasing results by using traces collected from different environments. This thesis
studies the problem of malware detection in recent versions of Windows, including Windows 7, 8,
Server 2008 (R2), and Server 2012 (R2). The techniques used for system call tracing in this study
are more robust than the techniques of API hooking and SSDT hooking used in the related work.
2.3.6 Online classification
The related work in behavioral malware detection focused primarily on classification of malware
based on rich feature sets extracted using specialized environments. This study seeks to use a more
limited dataset, namely only those system call features used by the described malware detector. The
classifier uses the information already available when malware samples are detected on production
hosts to provide immediate classification results. The motivation for online classification is to provide
information for mitigation and postmortem analysis. Prior information about similar threats can
be used to suggest possible mitigations, and classification results can be used to guide the use of
more rigorous static and dynamic analysis tools. Thus, the goal of this study is not to outperform
more rigorous techniques, but rather to achieve comparable classification accuracy in production
environments with a more limited feature set.
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Chapter 3: Experimental Setup
Experimental evaluation is essential for determining the effectiveness of malware detection and
classification systems [32, 43]. To evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques studied in this thesis,
system call traces were collected from benign and malicious software samples over a six-month period.
The traces were collected in home, research laboratory, and public computer laboratory settings,
and on a custom testbed, where recently discovered malware samples were executed. To collect the
traces, a custom host agent known as the System Call Service (SCS) was created. The main benefits
of the SCS are that it is low-overhead, transparent to the user, and can be deployed on any host
running a recent version of Microsoft Windows. This chapter describes the design and function of
the SCS. It also describes the datasets collected using the SCS, which are used to evaluate the feature
extraction, malware detection, and malware classification techniques described in Chapters 4-6.
3.1 System Call Service (SCS)
The SCS was created for two reasons. First, the specialized analysis tools used in the related
work to collect system calls offer a limited view of software functionality and exhibit high enough
overhead to preclude their usefulness in production environments. Second, alternative techniques
used in the related work rely primarily on application programming interface (API) hooking or
system service descriptor table (SSDT) hooking. The former technique requires the modification
of running software to intercept function calls, while the latter requires the overwriting of a kernel
data structure to intercept system calls. Both techniques affect the stability and reliability of the
systems on which they are deployed, and their usefulness is limited in recent versions of Windows.
In contrast to traditional system call analysis tools, the SCS
• uses built-in kernel logging functions available in recent versions of Windows;
• monitors access to every system call that is part of the core operating system (OS) kernel;
• does not require modification of monitored processes or kernel data structures; and
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Figure 3.1: System Call Service (SCS) block diagram, showing how system calls originating
from all processes, including applications, services and drivers, are captured by the SCS using
the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) framework
• exhibits low enough computational and memory overhead for deployment in production envi-
ronments.
The block diagram presented in Figure 3.1 illustrates the function of the SCS. The arrows indicate
the flow of system calls from applications, services, and drivers to the SCS where they are logged.
System calls are made in user-mode by applications and services through the Windows API and
in kernel-mode by device drivers and other code running at the kernel-level. The system calls are
handled by the system call interface, and the functions requested by the system calls are executed by
the OS kernel. The Windows kernel contains built-in kernel tracing functions provided by the Event
Tracing for Windows (ETW) framework. The SCS runs as a service application on the monitored
host.
The ETW framework is an event-driven framework. The events reported by the kernel tracer
include process creation and deletion, thread creation and deletion, system call enters and exits, and
context switches. The SCS tracks all of these events to attribute each system call to the process
and thread from which it originated. An example of the kernel tracer events and their metadata is
provided in Figure 3.2, which shows all of the system call enter, context switch, and thread start
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System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FB8EE0 on core 0
Context Switch Exchanged 9224 4 for 0 0 on processor core 7
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54CA7A30 on core 8
Context Switch Exchanged 7788 5488 for 0 0 on processor core 8
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FB8EE0 on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FB8EE0 on core 0
Thread start TID 8000 PID 5488
System Call Enter FFFFF801 5507FD84 on core 0
Context Switch Exchanged 0 0 for 8000 5488 on processor core 5
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FF92F0 on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54F9977C on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FA5CB4 on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54F9977C on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54F9977C on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FB0D24 on core 5
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FF92F0 on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 5507FE8C on core 5
Context Switch Exchanged 8000 5488 for 0 0 on processor core 5
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54F9977C on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FA5CB4 on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FF92F0 on core 0
System Call Enter FFFFF801 54FF92F0 on core 0
Context Switch Exchanged 0 0 for 5380 5424 on processor core 19
Figure 3.2: Kernel trace using Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), showing system call enter,
context switch, and thread start events over a 155µs interval
events collected over a 155µs interval. The system call events identify a system call by its memory
address (a 64-bit hexadecimal number), and identify the logical processor core on which each system
call originated. The SCS uses kernel debugging symbol tables to map the memory addresses to
system call names. The processes and threads executing on each processor core are identified by
the context switch events. The context switch events list the identifiers of the threads and processes
switched out of and onto a processor core. The identities of the processes and threads are determined
by monitoring the thread and process creation events.
Since the SCS tracks the threads and processes responsible for each system call, it can record
system call traces at the host, application, process, and thread levels. For this study, only process
level system calls are considered. The output of the SCS is a collection of system call traces, one
for every process observed on the monitored host. To assist in post-mortem analysis, the SCS also
records the following metadata for each host, process, and thread.
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Host metadata
• Kernel version
• Processor cores
• Host identifier
Thread metadata
• Start time
• Stop time
• Thread identifier (TID)
• Parent process
Process metadata
• Start time
• Stop time
• Process identifier (PID)
• Parent process
• Image name
• Image path
• Image checksum (MD5)
The PID and TID identifiers are values used internally by the OS to identify threads and pro-
cesses. The process image name, path, and checksum refer to the executable file from which the
process was created, and are used to identify the software applications associated with each process.
The host identifier is an anonymized identifier used to differentiate data collected from different
hosts.
The SCS runs on both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of Windows, including Windows 7, 8, 8.1, Server
2008, Server 2008 R2, Server 2012, and Server 2012 R2. It is written in C# using the Microsoft .NET
Framework version 4.5. The outputs of the SCS are a collection of files each containing the system
call trace of a single process, and a database containing the described metadata. A representative
dataset collected from running the SCS for 60 minutes on a production host included metadata
from 90 processes and 3,255 threads. For this study, the SCS was configured to collect the first
10,000 system calls made by every process. The SCS stores the system call traces in a concise binary
format, resulting in system call trace sizes of at most 20 KB.
3.1.1 Memory and computational overhead
To be useful for data collection in production environments, the SCS was designed to have minimal
memory and processing overhead. The memory overhead of the SCS was determined by checking the
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size in memory of the SCS under a variety of different conditions, including different OS versions,
.NET Framework versions, hardware configurations, and workloads. In total, the memory footprint
of the SCS was tracked over the period of one hour on 12 different hosts. The average memory
usage of the SCS process over the period of study was 50 MB. The SCS used more memory when
the workload on a system was high, particularly when there were a large number of processes being
simultaneously traced. In these circumstances, the SCS used as much as 170 MB of RAM. The
maximum memory usage was observed on a 12-core host serving as a virtual machine manager
(VMM) at nearly 100% CPU usage. Conversely, when the workload on a system was low and few
processes were being traced, the SCS used as little as 10 MB of RAM.
The computational overhead of the SCS was evaluated using the benchmark program PCMark81.
PCMark8 was used to characterize the computational overhead by comparing the benchmark perfor-
mance on a host running the SCS to the performance of the same host when the SCS was disabled.
The following benchmarks were used for this study:
• web browsing, which loaded and navigated websites;
• writing, which composed and manipulated text documents;
• photo editing, which displayed and manipulated image files;
• gaming, which rendered 3D graphics using DirectX;
• video playback, which played high definition video; and
• video encoding, which transcoded high definition video.
The PCMark8 benchmark program was chosen because its benchmarks represent real-world
use cases, and because it provides timing information for individual benchmarks. The baseline
performance was established by running the benchmarks on a host with the SCS disabled. For the
web browsing, writing, video encoding, and photo editing benchmarks, the overhead was measured
as the percentage increase in time it took to complete the benchmark over the baseline. For the
1PCMark8, FutureMark, http://www.futuremark.com
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Figure 3.3: Overhead analysis of the System Call Service (SCS) on a host in a home environ-
ment
gaming and video playback benchmarks, the overhead was measured as the percentage decrease in
the frame rate from the baseline. PCMark8 also provides an overall score, a weighted sum of the
individual benchmarks, that characterizes the overall performance of a system. The overhead for
the score was computed as the percentage decrease in the score.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the results of the benchmarks for a host in a home environment. The
figure shows the overhead of each of the benchmarks versus l, the maximum number of system calls
the SCS recorded from each process. The results presented are the average results from nine trials,
and the error bars show standard error of the mean (SEM) of the results. The results presented for
l = 0 are the baseline results achieved when the SCS was disabled.
Figure 3.3 shows that the SCS had no measurable effect on the video playback benchmark,
indicated by the near-zero overhead for all trace lengths. Video playback runs as a single process and
is neither processor-intensive nor system-call intensive. For the majority of the other benchmarks, the
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overhead increased with the trace length. For each benchmark, the overhead reached its maximum
value once the trace length was long enough to record the majority of the system calls made during
the execution of the benchmark. The web, writing, gaming, and video encoding benchmarks all
experienced a maximum of 2% overhead. The photo editing benchmark experienced 7% overhead,
independent of the length of the collected traces. The dashed line in Figure 3.3 indicates the overhead
as measured by the overall benchmark score, indicating a maximum overhead under 2%.
The processing and memory overhead introduced by the SCS is largely dependent on the type
and intensity of the system load. In particular, short-lived processes that are CPU and system call
intensive experience the highest overhead, incurred primarily during process creation and deletion.
The overhead of the SCS results primarily from its input/output (I/O) routines, since the SCS logs
process creation and deletion events and writes system call traces directly to disk. Furthermore, the
system call trace for each process is stored as a separate file, introducing file creation overhead at
the start of each trace and writing overhead at the end of each trace. These factors were largely
responsible for the high overhead observed for the photo editing task, which was both processor
intensive and involved the execution of many short-lived processes.
The SCS performs so much I/O because it is primarily a data collection tool, designed to record
raw system call traces. Raw system call traces were collected to study the effects of feature ex-
traction strategies, but would not be collected in a production deployment of the system. Rather,
the SCS would store aggregate information about the system call traces in memory and perform
detection and classification on the aggregate data. Thus, the I/O burden of the SCS would decrease.
Furthermore, the overhead of the SCS could likely be decreased by optimization of its source code
or by implementing critical features in a lower-level language.
3.2 Production data collection
The goal of this work is to evaluate the accuracy of a malware detection and classification system
against real-world datasets. To achieve this goal, the SCS was deployed in production environments
in a research laboratory, in a home environment, and in public computer laboratories. The main
purpose of this deployment was to collect traces from a variety of benign software programs against
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Figure 3.4: System Call Service production deployment, showing the home, campus, and
public computer lab hosts sending system call traces to a centralized system call database
which to evaluate the detector. Figure 3.4 shows a diagram of the production deployment, indicating
the three different types of hosts where the SCS was deployed. The SCS recorded system call traces
on the monitored hosts and periodically transmitted the data over the Internet to a centralized server,
where the system call traces were stored in a database for later processing. The centralized storage
and processing of system call traces was performed for research purposes only. For a production
deployment, the SCS would perform local collection of the traces, which would be processed as they
are collected.
The research laboratory and home environments included 14 hosts with a variety of different
configurations and uses. The hardware included laptops, desktops, and servers, with 1− 24 logical
processor cores and 2− 32 GB of RAM. The host OSs included Windows 7, 8, Server 2008 R2, and
Server 2012 R2. The hosts were used as workstations for desktop publishing, technical drawing,
scientific computing, web-browsing, gaming, and multimedia. Two of the hosts were servers used as
the VMM for a malware detection testbed. The data from these environments were used for model
development and to characterize the false positive rate (FPR) of the detector.
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Figure 3.5: Malware testbed block diagram
The SCS was deployed in two public access computing sites on 10 hosts. These computing sites
were part of KEYSPOT Network, led by The City of Philadelphia’s Office of Innovation and Tech-
nology (OIT), The Mayor’s Commission on Literacy, and The Department of Parks and Recreation
(PPR). The hosts were used by the public primarily for web-browsing and desktop publishing. They
were also used by students attending courses in technical literacy and professional development.
Users were provided a standard suite of pre-installed software and given permission to install addi-
tional software at their discretion. The hosts were workstations running 32-bit and 64-bit editions
of Windows 7. The data from the computing sites were used in a case study to determine how well
the developed techniques and models generalized to new environments.
3.3 Malware testbed
The malware testbed is a collection of 19 computer hosts created specifically for studying malware
behavior. The malware testbed was created to address the shortcomings of traditional malware
analysis environments, namely that they limit execution paths and monitor only a small fraction
of available system calls. More importantly, the malware testbed was created for consistency, so
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malware could be studied using the same set of tools and in the same environments as the benign
software. This was done to ensure that the tools and environments did not bias the study, and
to ensure that the developed techniques could be implemented in production environments with
comparable results. Figure 3.5 provides a block diagram of the malware testbed, indicating its four
primary components (highlighted in gray):
• a malware collector, which gathers malware samples to use for analysis;
• a controller, which coordinates the analyses of the malware samples;
• the testbed hosts, where the malware samples are executed; and
• a network simulator, wcich interacts with the malware samples.
3.3.1 Malware collector
The malware collector was used to gather malware samples to study on the testbed, with a focus on
collecting currently active malware threats. It collected malware by deploying honeypots, crawling
blacklisted websites, and importing existing threat collections. Honeypots are decoys used to attract
cyber-attacks and were used to collect the payloads delivered by such attacks. The malware collector
used the Dionaea2 honeypot as part of the Stratagem3 Linux distribution to collect such payloads.
URL blacklists are commonly used by web browsers and security software to prevent users from
visiting malicious URLs. The threat collector intentionally visited these URLs, scraping the websites
for suspected malware samples. Finally, the threat collector imported malware collected by other
means, including malware samples obtained from publicly available malware collections and manually
collected malware samples.
The metadata collector was used to collect information about each malware sample, including
its hash, file type, origin, target platform, and matching antivirus (AV) definitions. The metadata
collector used the free online virus scanning service VirusTotal4 to scan each incoming malware
sample against multiple commercial antivirus (AV) definitions, and used the file identification tools
2Dionaea low-interaction honeypot, http://dionaea.carnivore.it
3Stratagem honeypot distribution, http://sourceforge.net/projects/stratagem/
4VirusTotal, http://www.virustotal.com
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TrID and file to identify file types and target platforms. The collected metadata were stored
in a database along with the malware samples. For each malware sample, the collected metadata
included
• the number of AV detectors with which the sample was scanned,
• the number of positive detections,
• the AV labels of the sample,
• the date the sample was added to the collection,
• the source from which the sample was obtained,
• the date the AV results were last updated,
• the date the sample was first seen by VirusTotal,
• file and TRiD results, and
• MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the sample.
3.3.2 Controller and virtual machine hosts
The controller had two primary tasks, setting up the virtual machine (VM) hosts and injecting
malware. The controller interfaced with the Microsoft Hyper-V VMM to manage the VM images,
and used Microsoft PowerShell remoting to interface with the VM hosts. For each malware sample,
the controller performed the following sequence of tasks.
1. Restore a VM to a known clean state.
2. Transfer a malware sample onto the VM.
3. Start the VM with the SCS enabled.
4. Execute benign software on the VM at randomly determined time instances.
5. Execute the malware sample on the VM.
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6. Shut down the target VM.
7. Transfer the collected system call traces and metadata to a database for analysis.
The VM hosts
A challenge in executing malware samples is that, in general, the dependencies of the malware
samples are not known a priori. For example, a malware sample may require specific OS versions,
application frameworks, or target applications to perform its malicious tasks. To overcome this
challenge, multiple VM host configurations were employed on the testbed, including hosts configured
specifically for the testbed and hosts cloned from production environments. The hosts ran multiple
Windows OS versions, had different sets of software installed, and had varying levels of software
patches applied. This diversity was used to make it more likely that a malware sample would
execute successfully on at least one of the hosts in the test environment.
The malware testbed consisted of two physical servers, each running Windows Server 2012 R2
and Microsoft Hyper-V. The 19 VM hosts used for this study ran Windows 7 (32-bit and 64-bit
editions), Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 R2. The VM configurations each
included 1− 12 processor cores and 2− 8 GB of RAM. The software installed on each host included
multimedia editing software, programming utilities, a multimedia server, and desktop publishing
software.
Benign software
To mitigate potential bias that could arise from running only malware on the testbed hosts, the
controller executed both benign and malicious software on the hosts. More than 2,000 benign
applications were considered, including
• software distributed with the OS;
• video games, including first-person-shooters and card games;
• audio, video, and graphics viewing and editing software;
• office and productivity tools;
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• security-related tools, including AV software;
• Internet related software, such as web browsers, videoconferencing, torrent, and messaging
software; and
• system utilities, such as file management and registry editing tools.
The benign software were instrumented in two different ways; either the software were allowed to
run without any interaction, or application-specific, scripted tasks were performed. The former
approach was used to mimic the method by which malware was injected, while the latter was used
to mimic more realistic use. Scripted tasks included saved video games being replayed, system
monitoring and management tools performing predetermined actions, software being installed, and
benchmarks being executed. The benign software programs and OSs installed on the testbed were
also periodically updated to their latest versions during the data collection period.
Malware injection
The second primary task of the controller was the injection of malware samples onto the hosts. This
task was performed in the same manner that the benign software were executed, using PowerShell
remoting. Each VM instance was used to execute only one malware sample. Each sample was
executed at a randomly determined time after the VM was started, between zero and fifteen minutes,
and allowed to run for at least four minutes before the VM was terminated. Each malware sample
was executed only once on the testbed.
3.3.3 Network simulator
A challenge in characterizing malware behavior is allowing the malware to perform their malicious
functions as they would in a production environment without putting production systems at risk. To
minimize the risk to production systems, the VMs used in this study were connected to an isolated
network. However, many malware samples perform tasks that require Internet connectivity. Such
tasks include communicating with command and control servers, propagating to other vulnerable
hosts on the network, transmitting stolen information, and sending spam.
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To address this concern, the VMs were connected to an isolated network configured to route
all traffic from the VMs to a network simulator. The network simulator ran the Strategem Linux
distribution and a DNS server, configured to resolve all domain queries to the address of a Dionaea
honeypot. The honeypot configuration mirrored the configuration of the honeypot used for malware
collection (see Section 3.3.1). The honeypot provided network interaction with the malware, enabling
the malware samples to perform some of their network-centric tasks without exposing the malware
to a real-world network.
Over the course the described malware testing effort, the honeypot collected
• tens of thousands of logged TCP sessions per day;
• malicious binaries dropped by the malware samples executing on the testbed;
• detailed information collected by the malware samples about the testbed hosts, including
hostnames, IP addresses, license keys, passwords, and keylogger data;
• notifications from the malware samples indicating when a testbed host had been infected; and
• compressed or encrypted data files whose content could not be determined.
3.4 Malware samples
The malware collector described in Section 3.3.1 was used to collect more than 750,000 distinct
suspected malware samples, all standalone portable executable (PE) files. For this study, only those
samples first discovered after 1 January 2012 and identified as malicious by at least fifteen different
AV vendors were chosen. The first criterion was used to ensure that only recent malware samples
were used in the study, and the second criterion was used to ensure that the suspected malware
samples were actually malicious.
Of the malware samples studied, only a fraction successfully executed on the testbed. The
execution of a malware sample was considered successful if the processes created by the sample
ran for the duration of the data collection and performed at least 1,500 total system calls. These
criteria were established to ensure that enough information was collected from each malware sample
Chapter 3: Experimental Setup 3.4 Malware samples
40
Table 3.1: Most common malware categories used in this study, according to their Microsoft
and Kaspersky labels
Microsoft category samples
Backdoor 8,989
Worm 7,095
Virus 6,501
Trojan 6,371
Password stealer (PWS) 3,172
VirTool 3,105
TrojanDownloader 2,445
TrojanDropper 1,420
Rogue 996
TrojanSpy 713
Kaspersky category samples
Trojan 16,867
Backdoor 7,678
Virus 6,888
Worm 2,339
Trojan-Dropper 2,151
Trojan-Spy 2,048
Email-Worm 1,744
Trojan-Downloader 1,272
Trojan-Ransom 1,158
Net-Worm 1,029
to perform the analyses presented in this thesis. More than 55,000 distinct malware samples met
these criteria and were used in this study. Some 9,000 samples were executed on the testbed, but did
not produce enough data to be considered for the study. The majority of these samples terminated
immediately upon execution, likely because the host did not meet their requirements. Some 2,000
samples were injected on the testbed but failed to execute.
Among the malware samples used in this study, Table 3.1 shows the 10 most common malware
categories, according to their Microsoft and Kaspersky labels. The table shows the number of mal-
ware samples used in this study that belong to each of the categories. In total, the malware samples
represented 26 Microsoft categories and 25 Kaspersky categories. The most common categories were
Trojans, backdoors, viruses, worms.
Section 1.1 described two shortcomings of malware labeling systems, namely their incompleteness
and inconsistency. Table 3.1 and the data from which it was created provide additional evidence
of these shortcomings. First, nearly 25% of malware samples used in this study were unlabled
by the Microsoft naming scheme, and nearly 15% were unlabeled by Kaspersky, indicative of the
incompleteness of each of these naming systems. Furthermore, a comparison number of samples
in each category between the two tables illustrates the inconsistency of the naming schemes. For
example, nearly 50% of the labeled malware samples were identified as some type of Trojan by
Kaspersky, whereas only 25% of the labeled samples were identified as such by Microsoft.
Table 3.2 shows the 20 most common malware families among the malware samples used in this
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Table 3.2: Most common malware families used in this study, according to their Microsoft
and ESETNOD32 labels
Microsoft family instances
Worm.Mydoom 1,350
Backdoor.Fynloski 1,326
VirTool.CeeInject 1,201
Trojan.Malex 1,155
Backdoor.Bladabindi 1,132
Backdoor.Hupigon 1,082
Backdoor.Kelihos 1,041
Worm.Gamarue 1,010
Rogue.Winwebsec 877
PWS.OnLineGames 856
Worm.Allaple 762
Virus.Almanahe 756
Virus.Parite 711
TrojanDropper.Loring 703
Virus.Madang 699
VirTool.Obfuscator 647
Virus.Ramnit 644
Worm.Vobfus 632
Backdoor.Simda 617
Backdoor.Zegost 616
ESET family instances
Kryptik 4,799
Injector 4,765
Sality 1,990
Delf 1,721
AdWare.MultiPlug 1,530
MSIL/Injector 1,494
Mydoom 1,323
Agent 1,298
Fynloski 1,068
Hupigon 1,000
PSW.OnLineGames 982
Ramnit 961
IRCBot 949
MSIL/Bladabindi 816
Spy.Zbot 762
Alman 751
Madang 702
Farfli 662
Parite 652
VB 630
study, using the family names derived from their Microsoft and ESET labels. The tables show the
number of malware samples used in this study that belong to each of the families. In total, there were
1,373 Microsoft families and 1,012 ESET families represented in the malware set. The table indicates
that many common and well-defined malware families, such as MyDoom, Zeus/ZBot, and Ramnit
were among the most represented families used in this study. Other families listed in Table 3.2,
such as VirTool.Obfuscator and Injector, are more generically defined. VirTool.Obfuscator refers to
any generic obfuscated malware, and Injector refers to any malware that has the capability to inject
code into another process.
3.5 Ground truth labeling
The term “ground truth” refers to the absolute truth of something, and is used here to refer to the
assumed correct labels applied to the system call traces collected for this study. Although the ground
truth is treated as absolute, knowing whether every process is benign or malicious with certainty
is impossible. However, it is expected that the occurrence of errors in the ground truth are rare,
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thereby limiting the effects that incorrect ground truth have on the experimental results. Applying
ground truth labels to malware samples for classification presents another challenge altogether, as
the existing AV labeling systems are incomplete an inconsistent. As such, this study considered
multiple ground truth labeling schemes derived from AV labels.
The binary ground truth labels indicated whether a process was benign or malicious. For malware
classification, all of the processes labeled ‘malware’ were also given ground truth labels based on
their AV labels. The malware traces were labeled according to 27 different labeling schemes derived
from AV labels, including category and family labels. For each malware sample executed on the
testbed, all of the processes created by the sample were assigned the same label.
The binary ground truth was generated primarily by comparing the checksums of the executable
images from which the processes were created against the VirusTotal database. While this covered
the majority of the processes, there were others that were not in the VirusTotal database. These
processes either had their images submitted to VirusTotal for analysis or were labeled based on
the circumstances surrounding their execution. For example, unknown processes created after the
execution of a malware sample on the testbed were labeled ‘malware’. Among these were apparent
metamorphic or polymorphic malware samples, which spawned hundreds of processes, each with a
distinct checksum. Unknown processes created before the execution of malware sample or observed
in the laboratory or home environments were labeled ‘benign’.
3.6 Conclusions
The SCS was used for a six month data collection campaign that resulted in the collection of some
1,000 host-days of data from 43 hosts. Of the data that were collected, this thesis studies the set of
all processes whose system call traces contained at least 1,500 system calls. This restriction enables
accurate comparisons of detection performance on trace lengths up to 1,500 calls. The datasets used
for the experimental evaluation presented in this thesis include more than
• 135,000 system call traces from the execution of more than 55,000 distinct malware samples
on the tested;
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• 4 million benign process traces from the execution of more than 7,000 distinct benign executable
images; and
• 56,000 system call traces collected from public computer labs.
The collected data are used along with their ground truth labels to evaluate the effectiveness of
the feature extraction, malware detection, and malware classification techniques described in the
following chapters.
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Chapter 4: Feature Extraction
This chapter addresses the first of the three major challenges presented in this thesis, that of feature
extraction. Feature extraction is the process of representing raw data as a set of features that are
informative and that facilitate analysis. This chapter explores feature extraction techniques primarily
inspired by document classification and adapted to work with the system call traces collected by
the System Call Service (SCS) described in Section 3.1. This chapter divides the feature extraction
process into four components,
Information retrieval: the process of extracting information from raw system call traces to use
for detection and classification (Section 4.1);
Feature selection: the process of selecting the most informative subset of features (Section 4.2);
Feature scaling: the process of applying weights to the extracted features to facilitate analysis
(Section 4.3); and
Feature reduction: the process of reducing the number of dimensions of the feature data to remove
redundancy and facilitate analysis (Section 4.4).
Figure 4.1 depicts the end-to-end feature extraction process as it is performed in practice, indicat-
ing the primary transformations considered for each of the four components. The feature extractor
takes as its input a system call trace from the SCS and outputs the representation of the trace
as a numeric feature vector xˆ. The output feature vector xˆ is used as the input to the malware
detection and classification components of the system. The objective of this study is to identify the
subset of feature extraction techniques that afford the best detection and classification accuracy.
The remainder of this chapter provides detailed descriptions of the techniques considered for each
of the four components.
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Figure 4.1: Feature extraction process, showing each of the four stages and the the transfor-
mations performed at each stage
4.1 Information retrieval
Previous work in system call-based malware detection and classification identified informative fea-
tures, including call frequencies, ordered call sequences, and unordered call tuples (Section 2.1.3).
This thesis presents a comparative study of these three types of features, using feature extraction
techniques inspired by research in document classification. Document classification is the process
of identifying to which category a text document belongs. The similarity between the system call
traces used in this thesis and the datasets used for document classification is the structure of the
data. In document classification, a text document can be represented as an ordered sequence of
words. Similarly, a system call trace can be represented as an ordered sequence of system calls. In
document classification, the patterns of words can be used to identify one of many characteristics,
including the topic, tone, or author of the text. In malware analysis, the patterns of system calls
can be used to determine the function of a program [39].
Feature extraction begins with information retrieval, which is the process of extracting informa-
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Table 4.1: Ordered and unordered 2-gram representation of a system call trace
system call 1 system call 2 ordered unordered
NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtFreeVirtualMemory 1 2
NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtQuerySystemInformation 1 2
NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtQueryVirtualMemory 1 1
NtClose NtAllocateVirtualMemory 1 1
NtCreateSection NtMapViewOfSection 1 1
NtFreeVirtualMemory NtAllocateVirtualMemory 1 –
NtFreeVirtualMemory NtOpenDirectoryObject 1 1
NtMapViewOfSection NtQuerySection 1 1
NtOpenDirectoryObject NtOpenDirectoryObject 1 1
NtOpenDirectoryObject NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject 1 1
NtOpenFile NtCreateSection 1 1
NtOpenFile NtQueryVolumeInformationFile 1 1
NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject NtQuerySymbolicLinkObject 1 1
NtProtectVirtualMemory NtProtectVirtualMemory 1 1
NtProtectVirtualMemory NtQueryInformationProcess 2 3
NtQueryAttributesFile NtOpenFile 1 1
NtQueryInformationProcess NtProtectVirtualMemory 1 –
NtQueryInformationProcess NtQueryInformationProcess 3 3
NtQueryInformationProcess NtQuerySystemInformation 1 1
NtQueryPerformanceCounter NtProtectVirtualMemory 1 1
NtQuerySymbolicLinkObject NtClose 1 1
NtQuerySystemInformation NtAllocateVirtualMemory 1 –
NtQuerySystemInformation NtFreeVirtualMemory 1 1
NtQuerySystemInformation NtQuerySystemInformation 1 1
NtQueryVirtualMemory NtOpenFile 1 1
NtQueryVolumeInformationFile NtQueryAttributesFile 1 1
total 29 29
tion from the raw system call traces. For information retrieval, a bag-of-words model is used to
represent the traces. In text classification, a bag-of-words model is a representation of a text docu-
ment as a vector of word frequencies; i.e., a vector encoding the number of occurrences of each word
appearing in the document [107]. For malware analysis, a bag-of-words model is a representation of
system call trace as a vector of system call frequencies.
Representing a system call trace as a vector of system call frequencies is useful because the nu-
meric feature vectors facilitate malware detection and classification. However, system call frequencies
alone are not particularly informative (Section 5.4.1). Instead, this study also uses n-gram analysis
for information retrieval, where an n-gram is a contiguous ordered sequence of n items extracted
from from a larger sequence. The technique of n-gram analysis has applications in document clas-
sification and computational linguistics, where n-grams are sequences of letters or words extracted
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from a text [108, 109]. System call n-gram analysis has proven useful for intrusion detection when
paired with a signature-based detector (Section 2.1.3).
This thesis considers two different types of system call n-grams. Ordered n-grams are ordered
sequences of n system calls appearing contiguously in a trace. Ordered n-grams provide information
about the local ordering of system calls. Unordered n-grams are unordered sets of n system calls
appearing contiguously in a trace. Unordered n-grams provide information about which system calls
typically appear near each other, but do not consider the order in which the calls appear. Both types
of n-grams are extracted from system call traces using a sliding window approach. For this study,
the bag-of-words representation and n-gram analysis are combined, and each system call trace is
represented as a vector of n-gram frequencies. This information retrieval technique is referred to as
the bag-of-n-grams model.
An example bag-of-n-grams representation of a system call trace is shown in Table 4.1. The table
shows both the ordered and unordered 2-gram representations of the system call trace in Figure 1.1
in Section 1.3. The table lists every distinct sequence of two contiguous system calls appearing
in the trace, along with the frequency of occurrence of each. Whereas the ordered 2-gram repre-
sentation differentiates between the sequences 〈NtFreeVirtualMemory, NtAllocateVirtualMemory 〉
and 〈NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtFreeVirtualMemory 〉 and considers them to be distinct 2-grams,
the unordered 2-gram representation considers these sequences to be instances of the same 2-gram,
{NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtFreeVirtualMemory }. The ‘–’ symbol indicates that a sequence is a
reordering of another sequence listed in the table.
While Table 4.1 shows only the system call sequences appearing in the trace in question, a system
call trace can be more generally represented as a column vector x with one entry for each of the
possible system call n-grams. The SCS, which was used to collect the system call traces used in this
study, monitors access to 465 distinct system calls. Therefore, the length of the vector x is 465n
for the ordered n-gram representation, and O(465n) for the unordered n-gram representation. For a
system call trace of length l, where l 465n, x is sparse, i.e, the vast majority of the features in the
vector are zero. To take advantage of this sparsity, the feature vectors x are stored in a sparse array
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format when n > 1. Therefore, the storage complexity of a system call trace is O(l). The techniques
described in the following chapters, especially the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm used
to train the support vector machine (SVM) and logistic regression (LR) detectors and classifiers,
were selected to take advantage of the sparsity of the feature data.
4.2 Feature selection
The system call n-gram feature space is a very high dimensional space when n > 1. Furthermore, it
is not likely that every n-gram is equally informative for detection and classification. For example,
the frequency of occurrence of an article (such as ‘the’) in a text document likely conveys little
information about the topic of the document. Similarly, the frequency of occurrence of a commonly
used system call (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory) likely conveys little information about the
malicious function of a process. The goal of feature selection is to experimentally identify the subset
of n-grams that is most informative.
The motivation for feature selection is two-fold. First, the storage and processing of high-
dimensional datasets introduces memory and processing overhead. The memory overhead arises
from the storage of the feature vectors, and the processing overhead arises from the application of
feature extraction, detection, and classification algorithms. Minimizing such overhead is especially
important in this study, because detection and classification are to be performed online and in real-
time on production hosts. The number of features grows exponentially in n, causing a dramatic
increase in overhead as n increases. Second, including non-informative features during training
can lead to overfitting, degrading detection and classification accuracy. Overfitting occurs during
training when a detector or classifier erroneously includes uninformative features in its decision rule.
In this work, recursive feature elimination (RFE) was used for feature selection [110]. RFE
was chosen over alternate feature selection algorithms for three primary reasons: First, RFE is a
multivariate technique that considers the set of all features during feature selection. This contrasts
with univariate techniques, which consider each feature in isolation. The advantage in using a
multivariate technique is that relationships among distinct features are considered during feature
selection. Next, RFE performs feature selection by evaluating a detector or classifier’s accuracy
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against training data. Thus, the subset of features selected by RFE is the subset that maximize the
empirical accuracy of the detector or classifier used for analysis. Finally, RFE works with detection
algorithms that provide feature weights. This is especially useful because the detection algorithms
considered in this work that provided the highest detection accuracy provide feature weights. Those
two algorithms, SVM and LR, were used to perform RFE.
RFE consists of both a training algorithm and a testing algorithm. The training algorithm
determines the appropriate subset of features to use for analysis, and the testing algorithm eliminates
the uninformative features from consideration. The testing algorithm selects the appropriate subset
of features from the vector x. In practice, information retrieval and feature selection are combined
during testing so that the SCS collects only information about the selected n-grams.
The RFE training algorithm works by training the detector or classifier with the set of all features
and removing the feature(s) with the lowest weights from consideration. This process is repeated
recursively until the desired number of features is selected. Since detection and classification are part
of the RFE training process, the RFE training algorithm also performs feature scaling. Described in
detail in the following section, feature scaling is a necessary step for preparing the data for detection
and classification. Using the same feature scaling techniques for testing and training also ensures
that the features selected during training maximize the testing performance. The inputs to the
training algorithm are the set X of training instances, a vector y of the corresponding labels of the
training instances, and the desired number of features. The output of the training algorithm is the
selected subset of the original features. The RFE training process is summarized as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 is useful if the desired number of features is known a priori. To determine the number
of features to use for detection, RFE can be combined with cross-validation. Cross-validation is a
model validation technique used here to assess the effectiveness of the detection or classification
techniques used with RFE. Cross-validation is the process of partitioning a dataset into disjoint
subsets, using one subset for training and the other for testing. During RFE, cross-validation is
performed in two distinct steps. First, the training set is used train the detector or classifier. Then,
the testing set is used to evaluate the performance of the detector or classifier. Finally, the features
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Algorithm 1 Recursive feature elimination (RFE) training algorithm
desired number ← the desired number of features
X ← the training data
y ← the labels of the training data
selected features ← RFE(X )
function RFE(X )
if the number of features in X == desired number then
return selected feature subset
else
Perform feature scaling on X to get Xfs
Train the detection algorithm using the data Xfs and labels y to get the weights w
Xreduced ← the input X with the features with the lowest weight w removed
return RFE(Xreduced)
end if
end function
with the lowest weights are removed, and the process is repeated. The modified RFE training
algorithm with cross-validation is summarized as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Recursive feature elimination (RFE) training algorithm with cross-validation
X ← the training data
y ← the labels of the training data
scores ← an empty array to store the cross validation scores
RFECV(X )
function RFECV(X )
Partition X and y into training and testing sets
Perform feature scaling and train the detector using the training set to get w
Perform feature scaling and detection on the testing set
Evaluate the accuracy of the detector against the testing set
Prepend the accuracy to be beginning of the scores array
Xreduced ← the input X with the feature with the smallest weight w removed
RFECV(Xreduced)
end function
The RFE with cross validation training process is performed over multiple folds, and the accuracy
scores are averaged over the folds. The selected number of features is that which provides the
maximum cross-validation score,
desired number of features = arg max(scores). (4.1)
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After the desired number of features is selected, the RFE training process in Algorithm 1 is repeated
with the desired number as input to identify the appropriate feature subset to use for detection or
classification.
4.3 Feature scaling
Feature scaling is used to facilitate the application of detection and classification algorithms that are
sensitive to the ranges of the feature data. The motivation for feature scaling in this work is that
system call frequencies scale to different orders of magnitude. For example, in a subset of 6 × 109
system calls collected by the SCS, there were
• 4.3× 108 calls to NtQueryVirtualMemory,
• 1.9× 105 calls to NtRaiseHardError, and
• 19 calls to NtShutdownSystem.
The feature scaling transformations described in this section were selected to address the issue of
varying feature scales.
4.3.1 TF-IDF transformation
Term frequency – inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) transformation is an information retrieval
technique commonly used in document classification and also demonstrated to be useful in intrusion
detection [77, 111]. In document classification, frequently occurring words (such as ‘the’) are not
particularly informative, whereas rare words tend to carry a lot of information about the content of
a document. To address this issue, TF-IDF transformation applies weights to the word frequencies,
placing higher emphasis on rare words. Analogously, it is likely that frequently occurring system calls
(such as NtQueryVirtualMemory) are similarly uninformative. Therefore, TF-IDF transformation
is used to apply weights to system call sequences inversely to their frequency of appearance.
The TF-IDF transformation of a vector x is the element-wise product of two vectors: the term
frequency (TF), computed directly from the feature vector x, and the inverse document frequency
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(IDF), computed from the set X of all feature vectors,
TF-IDF(x,X ) = TF(x) IDF(X ) (4.2)
TF transformation can be applied directly to the feature data without any training. However, IDF
transformation requires training to learn the weights to apply to the features. This work considers
two different approaches for computing the TF. In the first approach, the TF is the raw n-gram
frequency,
TF(x) = x . (4.3)
This approach does not perform any feature scaling in the TF, instead relying on subsequent steps
to perform feature scaling. The second approach uses the logarithmic frequency of the n-grams
as the TF. This is done to account for the varying orders of magnitude of the features. With the
logarithmic frequency, Laplace smoothing is used to address the sparsity of the feature vectors [112],
resulting in the following expression,
TF(x) = log(x + 1) . (4.4)
Like the logarithmic frequency, the IDF addresses the varying feature scales. It applies feature
weights that vary inversely with frequency of occurrence of each feature, thereby placing higher
emphasis on rare n-grams. Considering N to be the number of traces in the training set X and d
to be a vector counting the number of traces in X in which each n-gram appears, the IDF is
IDF(X ) = log
(
1 +N
1 + d
)
+ 1 . (4.5)
Laplace smoothing is used in the IDF calculation to prevent zero divisions arising from the sparsity
of the data, and the result is offset by one to ensure that every feature receives a non-zero weight,
even if it appears in every trace in the training set X .
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4.3.2 Unit-magnitude scaling
TF-IDF transformation addresses the issue of the varying orders of magnitude of the feature data
using logarithmic frequency and IDF transformation. However, many machine learning algorithms
(such as SVM and LR) perform best when operating on more rigidly scaled features. To address
this issue, the TF-IDF transformed vectors are scaled to unit magnitude. For this work, both the
L1 (Manhattan) and L2 (Euclidean) norms are considered. Scaling to unit magnitude was chosen
over alternatives, such as rescaling or standardization, because it preserves the scale relationships
among the system calls. Thus, the complete feature scaling process, where ‖ · ‖ indicates either the
L1 or L2 norm, is
xs =
TF-IDF(x,X )
‖TF-IDF(x,X )‖ . (4.6)
4.4 Feature reduction
Feature reduction shares a common goal with feature selection; namely, to reduce the overhead of
the system. While feature selection accomplishes this by removing uninformative features, feature
reduction does so by identifying a non-redundant feature set. Feature reduction also has the benefit
of reducing the effect of the so-called curse of dimensionality, which refers to the diminished effec-
tiveness of certain machine learning algorithms in high-dimensional spaces [113]. This work considers
two approaches to dimension reduction, singular value decomposition (SVD) and linear discriminant
analysis (LDA). SVD is a matrix factorization algorithm, similar to principal component analysis
(PCA), that is used to project the features onto a lower dimensional feature space. The feature
space is selected such that the resulting features are uncorrelated. LDA also projects the features
onto a lower dimensional space. For LDA, the feature space is selected to maximize the distance
between training instances of different classes. Both SVD and LDA require training to determine
the appropriate feature projections.
4.4.1 Truncated singular value decomposition (SVD)
Truncated SVD is a matrix factorization used here to project feature vectors x onto a lower dimen-
sional space [114]. In the context of document classification when used with word frequencies, it is
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also referred to as latent semantic analysis (LSA). For training, SVD considers the matrix X, formed
by horizontally concatenating all of the feature vectors xi in the training set X ,
X =
[
x1 x2 ... xN−1 xN
]
, where xi ∈ X . (4.7)
The rank of the matrix X (i.e., the maximum number of linearly independent feature vectors
that can be found in X) is r. The truncated SVD algorithm uses matrix factorization techniques to
find an approximation Xk of X. The subscript k indicates that Xk is the rank k approximation of
X, where k ≤ r. The truncated SVD of rank k of X is
Xk = UkΣkV
T
k . (4.8)
Here, Σk is a k×k diagonal matrix formed from the square roots of the k largest nonzero eigenvalues
of XXT (or equivalently of XTX), Uk is composed of the corresponding orthogonal eigenvectors of
XXT , and Vk is composed of the corresponding orthogonal eigenvectors of X
TX. The truncated
SVD contrasts with the standard SVD, which considers all r nonzero eigenvalues of XXT . It is used
here instead of the standard SVD to further reduce the number of dimensions. Given the rank k
decomposition of X, a feature vector x can be projected to a k-element feature vector xk using the
transformation
xk = ΣkU
T
k x (4.9)
Truncated SVD is effective because the smallest values in Σk do not significantly affect the matrix
product Xk. Therefore, if only the smallest values are removed, Xk remains a close approximation for
X. The value k must be carefully chosen to appropriately reduce redundancy without significantly
reducing the discriminability afforded by the original feature set. The value of k is commonly selected
experimentally or so that the selected projection retains a fixed percentage of the variance in X.
The motivation for using truncated SVD for feature selection is two-fold. First, it has an ad-
vantage over other similar techniques, such as PCA, because it works well with high-dimensional,
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sparse datasets. Second, when provided with appropriately scaled inputs – e.g., the vectors output
by the feature scaling component described in the preceding section – the distribution of the result-
ing features are approximately Gaussian. Transforming the data to a set of Gaussian-distributed,
non-redundant features is especially useful for applying techniques such as LDA, described in the
following section.
4.4.2 Linear discriminant analysis (LDA)
LDA is a generalization of Fisher’s Linear Discriminant, and is useful for both feature reduction
and classification [113]. Whereas SVD transforms the feature data to eliminate redundancy, LDA
considers the class labels and transforms the data to separate the instances of different classes. LDA
assumes the class-conditional distribution of the features to be Gaussian and requires non-redundant
input features. Therefore, LDA is only applied to the SVD-transformed feature vectors xk. LDA
seeks a k′×k matrix W that projects xk onto a space of k′ features that maximize the between-class
separation of the projected data. The projection is given as
xk′ = Wxk (4.10)
where
k′ ≤ min(k,K − 1) . (4.11)
LDA is not particularly useful for the binary detection task, since a single dimension cannot be
reliably used to differentiate between malicious and benign processes. However, it is useful in for
classification, where the number of classes – and therefore the number of dimensions of the projected
data – is much larger. It is especially useful for classification techniques that work well with smaller
feature sets, such as nearest neighbor methods.
During training, the matrix W is selected to maximize the between-class covariance and minimize
with within-class covariance of the data in the projected space. It is computed using a training set
X of N traces, wherein the traces are partitioned into K classes, denoted as the sets Ck. The
between-class covariance of the projected data, where Nk is the number of training instances that
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belong to class k, µk is the mean of class k, and µ is the mean of all the data, is
sB =
K∑
k=1
Nk(µk − µ)(µk − µ)T . (4.12)
The within-class covariance of the projected data is
sW =
K∑
k=1
∑
xk′∈Ck
(xk′ − µi)(xk′ − µi)T . (4.13)
Given these two expressions, the matrix W is selected to maximize the multi-class Fisher criterion
J(W ), where Tr(·) indicates the matrix trace operation,
J(W ) = Tr(s−1W sB) . (4.14)
The Fisher criterion varies inversely with the within-class covariance and proportionally with the
between class covariance. Thus, finding the projection W that maximizes the Fisher criterion deter-
mines a feature space wherein data from similar classes are clustered together and separated from
those of differing classes.
4.5 Feature extraction evaluation
This chapter presented feature extraction as a four-step process containing information retrieval,
feature selection, feature scaling, and feature reduction steps. With the exception of information
retrieval, all of these steps include a training component, wherein labeled training data are used to
determine the parameters of the transformation. In practice, these parameters are learned using
the same set of training data used to train the malware detectors and classifiers described in the
following chapters. The parameters learned during training are used to transform the data during
testing.
One of the contributions of this thesis is the analysis of the effects feature extraction has on mal-
ware detection and classification accuracy (Sections 5.4.2 and 6.3.2). Combinations of the described
techniques and parameters are used for feature extraction, and their effectiveness is characterized by
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the accuracy of the detectors and classifiers with which they are used. The combination techniques
and parameters that afford the highest detection and classification accuracy are chosen for use in
the overall malware detection and classification system.
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Chapter 5: Malicious Process Detection
This chapter addresses the second major challenge of this thesis, the detection of malicious processes.
The three primary challenges in malicious process detection are
• differentiating between malicious and benign processes on production hosts in real-time;
• detecting malicious processes as quickly as possible, to mitigate adverse effects of executing
malware; and
• achieving a low enough false positive rate (FPR) to facilitate production deployment of the
detection system.
Section 5.1 addresses the first challenge by identifying machine learning and signature-based tech-
niques that are ‘lightweight’ enough to use for online detection. The chosen techniques were selected
for their low computational complexity during detection and their previously demonstrated effec-
tiveness in both document classification and malware detection. Section 5.2 addresses the second
challenge by providing sequential detection techniques that can be used for rapid malware detection.
The remaining sections address the third challenge by providing experimental evaluation and com-
parison of the detection algorithms described in this chapter and the feature extraction techniques
described in Chapter 4. Section 5.3 describes detector evaluation techniques, Section 5.4 presents the
experimental results, and Section 5.5 presents a case study wherein the described detection system
was used to detect malicious processes in public computer laboratories.
5.1 Malware detection algorithms
This study considers four different techniques for malicious process detection:
• a signature-based detector (Section 5.1.1),
• a multinomial log-likelihood ratio test (LLRT) (Section 5.1.2),
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• support vector machines (SVMs) (Section 5.1.3), and
• logistic regression (LR) (Section 5.1.4).
Each technique is used in a supervised learning context, wherein the models used for detection are
learned from labeled training data. The labeled training data consist of system call traces collected
from known malicious and benign processes. Each technique includes a training algorithm and a
testing algorithm. The training algorithm is used for model creation and the testing algorithm is
used for model evaluation.
The four techniques offer different approaches to detection. The signature-based detector iden-
tifies potential malware by comparing observed system call n-grams to a set of known malicious
n-grams. The log-likelihood ratio test (LLRT) models the class-conditional probability distributions
of the training data, and uses the models to compute the probability that the feature data come
from a malicious process. Finally, the support vector machine (SVM) and logistic regression (LR)
are linear detectors that represent the training data in Euclidean space. SVMs seek a hyperplane
to linearly separate the data, and LR develops a model to compute the probability a process is
malicious.
5.1.1 Signature-based detector
Signature-based detection techniques are especially popular in the related work in intrusion detec-
tion, where anomalous system call sequences are used to identify potential intrusions (Section 2.1.3).
Signature-based techniques are popular because of the white-box models they provide. That is, a
positive detection can be directly attributed to specific events. For example, when a malware sam-
ple is detected using the signature-based detector described in this work, the specific n-grams that
caused the positive detection are easily identified. This study considers a signature-based detector
that identifies potential malware by comparing the n-grams in a system call trace to a set of malware
signatures, i.e., a set of n-grams previously seen only in known malware. Unlike the other detectors
presented in this chapter, the signature-based detector uses only information retrieval for feature
extraction. n-gram frequency vectors.
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The signatures are created by considering a training set X of feature vectors xˆ extracted from
known malicious and benign processes. The vectors are partitioned into two sets, those collected from
benign processes XB, and those collected from malicious processes XM. The signatures are created
by identifying the set of features present in XM but not in XB. The signatures are represented by a
binary vector s that indicates which of the n-grams are members of the signature set. The vector
s is defined as the following, where si and xˆi are the i
th components of the signature vector s and
feature vector xˆ,
si =

1, if
( ∑
xˆ∈XM
xˆi
)
> 0 and
(∑
xˆ∈XB
xˆi
)
= 0,
0, otherwise.
(5.1)
For detection, the signature detector computes the number of system calls in a trace that match
signatures of known malware, and compares the result to a threshold λ. The detector labels a process
with a feature vector xˆ malicious if
sT xˆ > λ . (5.2)
The threshold λ is chosen experimentally to fine-tune the detector performance. While the advan-
tages of the signature-based detector are the simplicity of its training and testing algorithms and its
white-box model, its weakness is its simplistic characterization of malicious behavior that does not
generalize well to new malware samples and its tendency to overfit the training data.
5.1.2 Multinomial log-likelihood ratio test (LLRT)
The na¨ıve multinomial LLRT is a statistical test used in document classification [115]. It operates
on discrete-valued, non-negative feature data, such as the n-gram frequencies and term frequency –
inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) transformed feature data considered in this study. It mod-
els the class-conditional distributions of the feature data using a categorical distribution model,
assuming conditional independence of the features. It is desirable due to the simplicity of its train-
ing and detection algorithms and can provide useful detection results even when the independence
assumption does not hold.
During training, the algorithm estimates the class-conditional probability distributions of each
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feature xˆi from the training data. In this study, the probability distribution of the i
th feature is
described as the probability that the random variable (r.v.) Xˆi corresponding to the i
th feature
takes on the value xˆi. The class-conditional distributions of the training data are represented as
pXˆi|M (xˆi) for the malicious processes and pXˆi|B(xˆi) for the benign processes. For each possible value
xˆi, the probability density function pXˆi|M (xˆi) is estimated from the training data as the fraction
of total malware training instances for which the r.v. Xˆi takes on the value xˆi. That is, given
NM = card(XM),
pXˆi|M (xˆi) =
1
NM
∑
xˆ∈XM
1Xˆi=xˆi (5.3)
The probabilities pxi|B(xi) are similarly computed from the benign training data. Given a feature
vector xˆ, detection is performed by computing the likelihood ratio
Λ =
pXˆ|M(xˆ)
pXˆ|B(xˆ)
(5.4)
The conditional independence assumption enables the probabilities pXˆ|M(xˆ) and pXˆ|B(x) to be rep-
resented as the product of the marginal probabilities pXˆi|M (xˆi) and pXˆi|B(xˆi), respectively. Given m
as the total number of features, the detector performs a log-likelihood ratio test, wherein a process
is labeled malicious if
m∑
i=1
log
(
pXˆi|M(xˆi)
pXˆi|B(xˆi)
)
> λ. (5.5)
The detection threshold λ can be chosen under the Bayes criterion, based on error costs and prior
probabilities; or under the Neyman-Pearson criterion, by maximizing the true positive rate (TPR)
under a FPR constraint [116]. This work uses the latter approach, since prior probabilities that a
process is benign or malicious are in general not known.
The multinomial LLRT detector works with the TF-IDF transformed n-gram frequencies because
they are positive and discrete-valued. However, it does not work with feature extraction techniques
such as singular value decomposition (SVD) or linear discriminant analysis (LDA), which result in
feature data that can be approximated with a Gaussian distribution model. In such cases, the LLRT
can be used with Guassian marginal distributions. Here, the class-conditional marginal distribution
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of ith feature for the malicious processes is
pXˆi|M(xˆi) =
1
σi
√
2pi
exp
(−(xˆi − µi)2
2σ2i
)
, (5.6)
where µi is the maximum likelihood estimator of the mean of the training data,
µi =
1
NM
∑
X
xˆi , (5.7)
and σ2i is the the maximum likelihood estimator of the standard deviation of the training data,
σ2i =
1
NM
∑
X
(xˆi − µi)2 . (5.8)
The marginal probabilities pxi|B(xi) are similarly computed from the benign training data.
The LLRT detector is advantageous because its output probabilities can be used with sequential
detection [117] or data fusion techniques [118] that require probabilities of observations as input.
However, it is limited by its independence assumption, assumed marginal probability distributions,
and tendency to overfit the training data.
5.1.3 Linear support vector machines (SVMs)
Linear SVMs seek a hyperplane wT xˆ that optimally separates data points of two different classes.
The parameters w defining the hyperplane are learned from labeled training data. Detection is
performed on a feature vector xˆ by comparing the weighted sum wT xˆ to a threshold. A process is
labeled malicious if
wT xˆ > λ . (5.9)
In this work, the parameters w are calculated using stochastic gradient descent (SGD). SGD is
an optimization algorithm well suited to large-scale learning problems such as this, where both the
number of training instances and the number of features is very large, and the data are sparse [119].
The objective function SGD seeks to minimize is given in terms of the feature vectors xˆi and their
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corresponding labels yi ∈ {−1, 1}, where yi = 1 for malware traces and yi = −1 for benign software
traces. The objective function considers a regularization constant α, and a loss function L. The
regularization constant penalizes high model complexity, and the loss function penalizes detection
errors during training. Soft margin SVMs are used in this work, which allow for detection errors
during training. The advantage of using soft margin SVMs is that they allow for mislabeled training
data and are less sensitive to outliers than the hard-margin implementation. For soft margin SVMs,
the loss function L is the Hinge Loss,
L(t, y) = max(0, 1− ty) , (5.10)
and objective function is
E(w) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
L(yi,w
T xˆi) + α‖w‖2 . (5.11)
SGD approximates the gradient of E(w) by randomly iterating over the training data X and
considering each training vector x individually. The training algorithm makes a fixed number of
passes over the training data to arrive at an estimated solution for w. The complexity of the SGD
training algorithm for n > 1 is O(NPl), where N is the number of training samples, P is the
number of passes, and l is the number of system calls in a trace. For each training sample, the SGD
training algorithm updates the weights considering an adaptive learning rate ηt, which determines
the contribution of each estimated gradient to the feature weights. In this study, ηt is gradually
decaying. Given an initial value t0 and the current training iteration t, the learning rate is
ηt =
1
α(t0 + t)
(5.12)
The weights w are updated according to the approximate gradient and learning rate as
wt+1 = wt − ηt
(
∂L(yi,w
T xˆi)
∂w
+ α
∂(‖w‖2)
∂w
)
, (5.13)
where i = tmodN and the ordering of the training samples in X is randomized between passes.
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The SVM detector is advantageous because it does not operate on the same restrictive assump-
tions as the LLRT regarding the distribution and independence of the feature data. Instead, the SVM
detector assumes that the data are linearly separable. Furthermore, the SGD training algorithm
is advantageous because it works well with large numbers of training instances, high dimensional
datasets, and sparse datasets. Since it operates on training vectors individually, the SGD algorithm
enables the weights w to be updated as more training instances become available. This is advanta-
geous because the models are expected to require retraining to account for changes in both benign
and malicious software.
5.1.4 Logistic regression (LR)
Logistic regression (LR) is closely related to SVM, but instead of seeking a separating hyperplane,
LR provides a model for estimating the probability that a process is malicious or benign [120]. LR is
desirable because its probability estimates can be used with sequential detection [117] or data fusion
techniques [118] that require probabilities of observations as input. The objective function for LR
is the same as expression 5.11, using logarithmic loss instead of Hinge loss,
L(t, y) = log (1 + exp (−ty)) . (5.14)
The feature weights w can be used to compute the probability that a process is malicious as
pM(xˆ) =
1
1 + e−(wT xˆ)
, (5.15)
and the probability that a process is benign as
pB(xˆ) = 1− pM(xˆ) . (5.16)
A process is labeled malicious if the log-likelihood ratio of these quantities exceeds a threshold,
log
(
pM(xˆ)
pB(xˆ)
)
> λ . (5.17)
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5.2 Sequential malware detection
Sequential detection, also known as sequential hypothesis testing, is the process of performing de-
tection when the sample size is not known in advance. For malware detection, the sample size is l,
the length of the system call traces. The detection algorithms described in the preceding sections
assume that the trace length is fixed and perform detection when exactly l system calls have been
observed. A sequential detector operates as the traces are collected and makes a decision when there
is sufficient evidence to support the decision.
The motivation for using sequential detection techniques here is two-fold. First, they enable
more rapid detection of malicious processes than is possible with fixed sample size techniques. This
is useful to minimize the adverse effects of executing malware. Second, they enable the detection
of changes in the behavioral characteristics of a process. This is important for detecting so-called
latent malware, which only exhibit malicious behaviors when certain conditions are met. Further-
more, sequential detection techniques potentially can be used to detect intrusions, exploitation, code
injection, and other malicious behaviors that occur in already-executing processes. This section de-
scribes adaptations of two different sequential detection techniques, Wald’s sequential probability
ratio test (SPRT) and Page’s cumulative sum (CUSUM) test, to the malware detection problem.
Each sequential detection technique is used together with the LR detector described in the preceding
section.
5.2.1 Wald’s sequential probability ratio test (SPRT)
The sequential detection problem was formulated by Abraham Wald [117] as a simple binary hypoth-
esis testing problem. Given a sequence of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) realizations
〈z1, z2, z3, ...〉 of a r.v. Z, either hypothesis H0 or H1 is true
H0 : 〈z1, z2, z3, ...〉 i.i.d.∼ p0
H1 : 〈z1, z2, z3, ...〉 i.i.d.∼ p1 .
(5.18)
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That is, the realizations 〈z1, z2, z3, ...〉 are either drawn from a probability distribution p0 or p1.
The goal is to identify which alternative is true as quickly as possible, subject to TPR and FPR
constraints. The SPRT uses a sequential probability ratio Λi as a decision statistic. The ratio Λi is
defined recursively, where Λ0 = 0, as
Λi = Λi−1 × p1(zi)
p0(zi)
(5.19)
Whereas the fixed sample size detection algorithms described previously in this chapter each con-
sidered a single decision threshold λ, Wald’s SPRT considers two decision thresholds, λ1 and λ0. At
each iteration, one of the following actions is taken.
• If Λi > λ1, stop and declare H1 to be true.
• If Λi < λ0, stop and declare H0 to be true.
• Otherwise, continue.
The thresholds are chosen to achieve a desired FPR and TPR. Conservative choices for the thresholds
are
λ1 =
TPR
FPR
,
λ0 =
1− TPR
1− FPR .
(5.20)
The present problem of sequential malware detection has two primary differences from the se-
quential detection problem posed by Wald. First, the two detection algorithms that provide proba-
bilities as output (LR and the LLRT) are machine learning algorithms operating on high-dimensional
datasets and not simple binary hypothesis tests. Second, each new data sample in the malware de-
tection problem is a new system call n-gram, and not an independent realization of a r.v. The
first difference necessitates the experimental determination of the decision thresholds λ0 and λ1,
since expression 5.20 was derived from the assumption that a simple binary ratio test was being
performed. The second issue is addressed by performing block-wise feature extraction on the system
call traces, using a fixed block size lb. For example, a trace containing 1500 calls can be viewed
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instead as a sequence of 15 disjoint traces of length lb = 100. The complete sequential malware
detection procedure using Wald’s SPRT is described by the following steps.
1. Collect lb system calls.
2. Perform feature extraction on the system calls to determine xˆi
3. Perform detection on xˆi using LR.
4. Compute the sequential probability ratio in expression 5.19.
5. Perform the two threshold tests.
6. If no decision has been made, repeat.
The procedure is repeated until one of the two alternatives is chosen, i.e., the process is declared
‘benign’ or ‘malicious’.
5.2.2 Page’s cumulative sum (CUSUM) test
Wald’s SPRT begins when a process is created and terminates when the process is determined to
be benign or malicious. Since the detector makes only a single decision and bases it only off of the
beginning of a process’s execution, a malicious process could evade detection by initially behaving
like a benign process. This type of attack, known as a mimicry attack, could similarly be used
against any of the fixed sample size tests described in the previous section, which operate only on
the first l calls in each system call trace.
This section considers an alternative sequential test chosen to address the concern that malware
might evade detection by delaying their malicious functions. Page’s CUSUM test, originally de-
scribed as a method for detecting faults in industrial processes, formulates the sequential detection
problem as a quickest change-point detection problem [121]. The goal in change-point detection is
to detect an abrupt change in a process. Whereas the goal in Wald’s SPRT is to determine whether
a sequence 〈z1, z2, z3, ...〉 is drawn from a distribution p0 or p1, the goal in Page’s CUSUM test is to
identify if and when the distribution of the realizations zi change from p0 to p1.
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Page’s CUSUM test uses the same decision statistic as the SPRT, the recursively defined cumu-
lative likelihood ratio defined in expression 5.19. However, instead of setting two fixed thresholds,
the CUSUM test uses a single adaptive threshold. The intuition behind Page’s CUSUM test is that
as long as H0 is more likely, the ratio
p1(zi)
p0(zi)
(5.21)
will tend to be less than 1, whereas it will tend to be greater than 1 if H1 is more likely. The test
decides H1 to be true if a significant increase in Λi is observed. At each iteration, the CUSUM test
takes one of the two following actions.
• If Λi −min
j≤i
(Λj) > λ, stop and declare H1 to be true.
• Otherwise, continue.
Page’s CUSUM test does not terminate until the hypothesis H1 is determined to be true. Thus,
when used for sequential malware detection, the CUSUM test continues to monitor every process
until malicious behavior is detected or until the process terminates. For malware detection, the
CUSUM test is used together with the LR detector, similar to the approach taken with Wald’s
SPRT. The CUSUM test is performed block-wise and the detection threshold λ is determined ex-
perimentally.
5.3 Malware detector evaluation
This chapter presented four detection algorithms and two sequential detection procedures for iden-
tifying malicious processes. To determine the effectiveness of these detection techniques, each was
experimentally evaluated against system call traces collected from production environments and
from recently discovered malware samples. This section describes the performance measures and
cross-validation techniques used to evaluate the described malware detectors.
5.3.1 Detector performance measures
Detection performance is studied primarily in terms of two values,
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False positive rate (FPR): the fraction of benign processes incorrectly identified as malware;
and
True positive rate (TPR): the fraction of malware samples correctly identified as malware.
While the FPR is defined in terms of the processes, the TPR is defined in terms of malware samples.
This distinction is made because the number of processes created by the malware samples in this
study varied significantly, with some samples creating thousands of processes and others creating
only one. Presenting the TPR in terms of malware samples prevents malware samples composed of
many processes from biasing the results.
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of a detector is a plot of the detector’s TPR
versus its FPR, created by varying the detection threshold λ and plotting the TPR and FPR achieved
at each threshold. The ROC curve depicts the trade-off between the TPR and the FPR of a detector.
The area under the curve (AUC) of the ROC can be used to quantify the overall accuracy of a
detector. A perfect detector has an AUC of 1, whereas a detector that makes decisions randomly
has an AUC of 0.5.
This study focuses primarily on detector performance under specific FPR and TPR constraints,
as indicated by Neyman-Pearson lemma [116]. In particular, this study presents the maximum TPR
achieved by a detector at a fixed FPR. This study focuses on the maximum TPR that a detector
can achieve at a FPR below 10−5. For the data used in this study, a FPR of 10−5 corresponds to
approximately one false positive every 17.5 host-days.
The sequential detection algorithms are evaluated in in terms of their FPR, TPR, and average
detection delay (ADD), which can be tuned by adjusting the detection thresholds. Here, the ADD
is the average delay between the start of a process and a decision being made by the detector. The
ADD is measured as the average number of system calls observed by the detector before a decision
is made.
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5.3.2 Cross-validation
Cross-validation is a model validation technique used to assess the effectiveness of the detection
techniques described in this chapter and the classification techniques presented in the next chapter.
Cross-validation is the process of partitioning a dataset into complementary subsets, using one subset
for training and the other for testing. Cross-validation is useful for assessing how a detector will
perform against an independent dataset.
In this work, cross-validation is performed by splitting the data into training and testing sets
along dataset boundaries. That is, the training-testing splits never occur within a set of traces
collected during the same System Call Service (SCS) data collection session. This partitioning
scheme ensures that the set of malware samples represented in the training and testing sets are
always disjoint, i.e., detection accuracy is only evaluated against a different set of malware samples
than are is for training.
Ten-fold cross-validation was used to obtain the results presented in this thesis. In 10-fold cross
validation, the data are partitioned into ten subsets. At each cross-validation fold, one subset is
chosen as the testing set, and the remaining nine are used for training. The results of 10-fold
cross-validation are presented in terms of the mean performance achieved across the cross-validation
folds. The measurements of the performance of a detector across 10 folds are represented as Z =
{z1, z2, ..., z10}. In the following section, the average performance is presented along with its standard
error, the standard error of the mean (SEM), where σZ is the variance of Z,
SEM(Z) = σZ√
10
. (5.22)
In discussions of significance in the analysis of the detection results, an independent two-sample
t-test is used to assess whether differences in performance are statistically significant. The two-
sample t-test computes the t statistic from two sets of measurements, Z1 and Z2 as the following,
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where µZi and σ
2
Zi are the mean variance of the i
th set,
t =
µZ1 − µZ2√
1
2
(
σ2Z1 + σ
2
Z2
)√
2
10
. (5.23)
In this thesis, results are evaluated to a 5% significance level, i.e., a difference is considered statis-
tically significant when the p-value of the t-test is below 5%.
5.4 Experimental malware detection results
The detection results presented in this section are presented primarily in terms of the TPR achieved
by the detectors at a fixed FPR of 10−5. The results were achieved through cross-validation per-
formed on the data collected from the home and campus environments, and from the malware
testbed. Among the experimental results described in this section are
• a comparison of the four detection algorithms (Section 5.4.1),
• a comparison of the feature extraction techniques (Section 5.4.2),
• a detailed analysis of the most informative n-grams (Section 5.4.3),
• a study of the effects of drift on detection (Section 5.4.6), and
• a study of the accuracy of the detector against specific malware families (Section 5.4.7).
The experimental results presented in this section are used to identify the algorithms and parameters
that provide the highest detection accuracy.
5.4.1 Detector, n-gram length, and trace length comparison
This section explores of the effects of three parameters on detection accuracy,
• the chosen detection algorithm,
• the length n of the system call n-grams, and
• the length l of the system call traces.
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This study compares the performance of each of the four detection algorithms described in Sec-
tion 5.1, the LR, SVM, signature-based (SIG), and multinomial LLRT detection algorithms. With
the exception of the signature-based detector, the following feature extraction strategy was used:
• ordered n-grams of lengths n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
• system call traces of lengths l ∈ [100, 1500];
• logarithmic n-gram frequencies;
• inverse document frequency (IDF) transformation; and
• L2 normalization (for the SVM and LR detectors only).
For the signature-based detector, none of the feature transformations were applied.
The above feature selection strategy was not chosen arbitrarily, but rather selected through an
iterative experimental process used to determine the best combination of feature selection param-
eters. However, since the selection of feature extraction strategies, trace lengths, n-gram lengths,
and detectors are inherently coupled, the experimental results of this process are presented here to
narrow the scope of the results in the following section to a single detector and n-gram length.
Figure 5.1 provides the experimental results of this analysis. The figure includes five plots, one
for each value of n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Each plot shows four traces, one for each of the detectors. The
traces show the TPR of the detector for a fixed FPR of 10−5 versus the trace length l. The four
primary conclusions drawn from the results shown in Figure 5.1 are summarized below.
First, system call frequencies alone are insufficient for the detection of malicious pro-
cesses. The first plot in Figure 5.1 shows the detection results when n = 1. The 1-gram represen-
tation of a system call trace describes the frequency at which each system call appears in a trace.
The plot shows the signature-based 1-gram detector achieved a TPR of 0 at every trace length. Fur-
thermore, the ROC curve of the signature-based detector (not shown) had an AUC of 0.5, indicating
that it provided no discrimination at all, even at higher FPRs. This result indicates that there are
no system calls that are used exclusively by malware. The other three detectors do provide some
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of the LR, SVM, SIG, and LLRT detectors, comparing performance
for different n-gram lengths and system call trace lengths l, with detector TPRs presented at a
fixed FPR of 10−5
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discrimination, shown in Figure 5.1 by the nonzero TPR they achieved at higher trace lengths. The
maximum TPR achieved by a 1-gram detector did not exceed 30%, whereas considering any value
of n > 1 provided a TPR that exceeded 90%. Thus, system call n-gram analysis offers much higher
detection accuracy than can be achieved using system call frequencies alone.
The LLRT and signature detectors perform poorly at low FPRs. For n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
both detectors significantly underperformed the LR and SVM detectors. The main drawbacks that
limit the effectiveness of the LLRT detector are the multinomial probability models it uses for de-
tection and its assumption of conditional independence of the features. The multinomial probability
models overfit the training data and do not generalize well to the testing data. Furthermore, con-
ditional independence is not a good assumption for the system call n-gram data. The inclusion
of highly correlated features and uninformative features contributes to its poor detection perfor-
mance. The signature-based detector is also limited by the simplicity of its model. The n-gram
signatures identified during training are mainly artifacts of the individual malware samples and do
not generalize well to detecting other malware samples.
Detection accuracy peaks at a trace length of around 1000 system calls. This effect is
most pronounced for the performance of the LR and SVM detectors for n ∈ {3, 4, 5}. While detection
accuracy generally increases with trace length for l < 1000, increasing l beyond 1000 did not offer
statistically significant increases in detection accuracy. The detector was able to identify the studied
malware samples based on their behavior during their initial phases of execution. The observed
behaviors of the malware samples during their initial execution included
• propagation within a host or over the network;
• ‘phoning-home’ to indicate to a remote server when a new host was compromised;
• modifying the host configurations to hide the presence of malware;
• installing the malware to ensure their permanence;
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Figure 5.2: Detector n gram length analysis, showing the maximum TPR observed at FPR =
10−5 for n-gram lengths n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
• disabling security software and other functions that might be used for malware removal or
detection;
• spawning additional malware processes;
• collecting information about infected hosts;
• activating keyloggers, password stealer (PWS), and other spyware components; and
• installing additional malware samples on infected hosts.
Maximum detection accuracy is achieved when n = 3. Figure 5.2 shows the maximum
TPR achieved by each detector at each n value in Figure 5.1. For each value of n, it shows the
maximum TPR achieved at a fixed FPR of 10−5. The figure shows that using n > 3 does not
provide statistically significant improvement in the TPR for the LR or SVM detectors. When n > 3,
both the dimensionality of the data and the number of nonzero features exceed the number of
processes included in the training set. This likely contributes to the overfitting of the detectors to
uninformative features.
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The detection results presented in this section serve to scope the remainder of the analysis pre-
sented in this chapter. First, only the LR and SVM detectors are considered for the remainder of this
chapter, since these detectors significantly outperformed the LLRT and signature-based detectors.
Since the LR and SVM provided similar results, the remainder of this chapter focuses primarily
of the LR detector. Second, only 3-grams of system calls are considered for the remainder of this
chapter, since values of n > 3 did not offer statistically significant improvement in detector TPR,
but did introduce substantial memory and processing overhead.
5.4.2 Feature extraction comparison
As illustrated in the previous section, feature extraction strategy has a significant effect on overall
detection performance. While the previous section focused on the effects of n-gram and trace length,
this section explores the effects of four additional feature extraction options. These options are
• using (1) L1 or (2) L2 normalization for feature scaling,
• using (F) raw frequencies or (L) logarithmic-frequencies for term frequency (TF) computation,
• using (T) TF transformation alone or (I) TF-IDF transformation, and
• using (O) ordered or (U) unordered 3-grams.
Each of the four techniques is uniquely identified by the single character labels provided in parenthesis
in the list above. In this section, all sixteen possible combinations of these options are compared
for the LR detector, using 3-grams of system calls and a system call trace length of l = 1500.
Figure 5.3 shows the TPR achieved at a fixed FPR of 10−5 for each of the sixteen combinations.
The conclusions drawn from these results are summarized below.
L2 normalization (2) outperforms L1 normalization (1) by a large margin. L1 normal-
ization was considered because of its straightforward interpretation as the relative frequency of
each 3-gram. That is, each feature value represents a fraction of the total 3-grams observed in
the trace. However, such features perform poorly in practice mainly due to the LR training and
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Figure 5.3: Detector feature extraction comparison, showing TPR achieved at FPR=10−5 for
the feature extraction strategies described in Section 5.4.2
testing algorithms, which perform better with L2 normalized features. These results are also consis-
tent with results from document classification, which indicate that the L2 norm provides superior
performance [122].
When the L2 norm (2) is used, Logarithmic frequencies (L) outperform raw frequencies
(F) by a large margin. As with words in text documents, the system call n-gram frequencies in
this study scale to different orders of magnitude [122]. This problem of differing feature scales is the
reason for the comparatively poor performance of the raw frequencies. Although IDF transformation
is used to provide higher weights to rare n-grams, the effect of this transformation alone is not
significant enough to fully overcome the scaling issue. Using logarithmic frequency is a necessary
step to address the issue of feature scale.
The combination of using the L2 norm, logarithmic frequencies, IDF transformation
and ordered n-grams (2LIO) provided the highest detection accuracy. The last four en-
tries in Figure 5.3 provide insight into the effects of IDF transformation and system call ordering.
The results show that ordered n-grams and IDF transformations each outperform their counter-
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Figure 5.4: Feature selection analysis, showing (a) detector TPR vs. number of selected
features and (b) a comparison of three different feature subsets against the set of all features
vs. trace length
parts. However, neither of these parameters in isolation offer statistically significant improvement.
Using both ordered n-grams and IDF transformation does offer significant improvement over using
unordered n-grams and only TF transformation. Thus, the remaining detection results presented in
this chapter all use the 2LIO feature extraction strategy with 3-grams of system calls.
5.4.3 Feature selection
This section focuses on feature selection, the process of identifying the subset of ordered 3-grams
that provide the best overall detection performance. Feature selection is used to mitigate overfitting
and to decrease the overall memory and computational burden of the detection system. Of the
more than 100 million possible ordered 3-grams of system calls, more than 250 thousand distinct
3-grams were present in the system call traces used for feature selection. Feature selection was
performed using recursive feature elimination (RFE) and the LR detector, removing 100 features at
each recursive step.
Figure 5.4a shows the detector TPR at a fixed FPR of 10−5 and 10−6, versus the number of
features chosen using RFE. The TPR increases sharply as the number of features increases to around
1,000. After then, there is no statistically significant change in the TPR achieved by considering
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Table 5.1: System calls present in the selected feature set of 4,000 3-grams
Category Calls Examples
Atoms 4 NtAddAtomEx, NtFindAtom
Boot 2 NtModifyBootEntry, NtAddBootEntry
Debuging 8 NtSystemDebugControl, NtDebugActiveProcess
Device driver control 1 NtUnloadDriver
Environment settings 9 NtSetSystemInformation, NtSetDefaultLocale
Error handling 3 NtRaiseHardError, NtRaiseException
Files and general I/O 29 NtReplacePartitionUnit, NtLockFile
Jobs 4 NtTerminateJobObject, NtAssignProcessToJobObject
local procedure call (LPC) 16 NtCreatePort, NtSecureConnectPort
Memory 17 NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtQueryVirtualMemory
Miscellaneous 36 NtQuerySystemInformation, NtQueryLicenseValue
Objects 12 NtQueryObject, NtSetInformationObject
Plug and play 4 NtPlugPlayControl, NtPlugPlayGetDeviceProperty
Power management 3 NtSetSystemPowerState, NtIsSystemResumeAutomatic
Processes and threads 31 NtQueryInformationProcess, NtOpenProcess
Processor Information 1 NtSetLdtEntries
Registry 24 NtSetValueKey, NtNotifyChangeKey
Security 23 NtImpersonateThread, NtSetSecurityObject
Synchronization 18 NtCreateMutant, NtCreateSemaphore
Timers 8 NtQueryPerformanceCounter, NtCreateTimer
additional features. The maximum average TPR in Figure 5.4a occurs at 3,000 features. The
detection performance achieved using the same set of 3,000 features is presented in Figure 5.4b for
system call trace lengths l ∈ [100, 1500]. The figure shows the TPR of the detector at a fixed FPR
of 10−5 versus the trace length l. It compares the performance of the detectors using sets of 3,000,
4,000, and 5,000 features to the performance of the detector using all of the features. The 3,000-
feature detector significantly underperforms detector using all the features for certain system call
trace lengths, including l = 500 and l = 700. However, the detector using 4,000 features achieves
comparable detection performance to the detector using all the features for every considered trace
length. The set of 4,000 features was chosen over the set of 3,000 because it provided comparable
performance at l = 1500 and better performance at shorter trace lengths.
Of the 465 system calls monitored by the SCS, 253 distinct calls were present in the chosen set
of 4,000 features. The selected calls are summarized in Table 5.1, which shows the categories of the
calls, the number of calls in each category, and example calls from each category. Every one of the
system call categories presented in Section 1.3 is represented in the chosen feature set. Similarly,
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every category is also represented in the set of features that were not chosen. Therefore, no single
class or even collection of system call classes provide the discrimination between malware and benign
software.
The chosen 3-grams also illustrate the range of functionality covered by the selected features.
Some of the selected 3-grams contained system calls from multiple categories, such as
• 〈NtOpenKeyEx, NtSetInformationProcess, NtTraceControl 〉;
• 〈NtRegisterProtocolAddressInformation, NtResumeThread, NtSetSystemPowerState 〉; and
• 〈NtTerminateThread,NtRenameKey,NtDeleteWnfStateData 〉.
Other selected 3-grams were composed of calls only from a single category, such as
• 〈NtOpenKeyEx, NtQueryKey, NtEnumerateKey 〉 (Registry);
• 〈NtQueryAttributesFile, NtOpenFile, NtLockFile 〉 (Files and general I/O);
• 〈NtTerminateThread, NtTerminateThread, NtSuspendThread 〉 (Processes and threads);
• 〈NtAccessCheckByType, NtAccessCheckByType, NtAccessCheckByType 〉 (Security); and
• 〈NtReplyWaitReceivePortEx, NtAlpcConnectPort, NtAlpcSendWaitReceivePort 〉 (LPC).
The results of the feature selection study presented in this section indicate that there are no sim-
ple, intuitive rules for selecting informative n-grams, and that feature selection should be performed
empirically. Some approaches in the related work have considered only system call features that seem
intuitively informative, such as filesystem, registry, and security-related system calls. However, the
results presented here indicate that all categories of system calls are informative for malware detec-
tion. Finally, there are significant gains in terms of memory and processing overhead in collecting
and processing only the most informative n-grams. Feature selection reduced the feature space from
over 100 million features to only 4,000 features.
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Figure 5.5: Regularization analysis, showing the TPR achieved at FPR=10−5 for the SVM
and LR detectors for a range of regularization parameters α
5.4.4 Regularization
The optimization problem solved during training for both SVM and LR, shown in expression 5.11
in Section 5.1.4, includes a parameter α, a regularization constant that penalizes high model com-
plexity. The regularization constant penalizes the norm of the feature weights w that compose the
model. Figure 5.5 presents the accuracy of the LR and SVM detectors for a range of regularization
parameters, showing the TPR of the detectors at a fixed FPR of 10−5. In general, the TPR decreases
as the regularization parameter α increases, indicating that the detectors benefit from the discrim-
inability afforded by the higher model complexity. Provided α falls within the range [10−9, 10−7],
the LR and SVM detectors offer comparable detection performance.
5.4.5 Block-wise detection performance
The detector comparison in Section 5.4.1 indicated that all of the detectors perform relatively poorly
for small trace lengths. This observation raises the question: Is the poor performance at small trace
lengths an artifact of the relatively small sample size, or is it caused by a lack of discriminatory
information at the beginning of the traces? To address this question, Figure 5.6a presents the block-
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Figure 5.6: (a) Block-wise detection analysis, showing LR TPR for blocks of 100 system calls
beginning at the specified offsets and (b) a comparison of the LR detector TPR at a fixed FPR
of 10−5 when all data are used and when the first 100 calls are ignored
wise detection performance of the LR detector for blocks of 100 system calls. The figure presents
the TPR of the detector achieved for each block at fixed FPRs of 10−5, 10−4, and 10−3. Specifically,
the first point of the plot shows the detection performance when considering only the first block of
100 system calls from each trace, the second point shows the detection performance for the second
block of 100 calls from each trace, and so on.
Figure 5.6a shows comparatively poor performance for the first 100 system calls, especially at
an FPR of 10−3. This observation indicates that the first 100 system calls are not as informative
as the rest of the calls. This is due in large part to the nature of the calls at the beginning of a
processes execution. The calls are mostly related to generic start-up procedures, such as memory
allocation, that are common to all processes. For the same reason, the first ∼ 500 system calls are
also comparatively less informative than the remaining system calls, although this difference is less
pronounced.
Figure 5.6b shows the effects of ignoring the first 100 system calls on detection performance. It
shows the TPR of the LR detector for a fixed FPR of 10−5 versus the trace length. It compares
the case where the first 100 system calls are ignored and the case where all of the system calls are
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considered for detection. Ignoring the first 100 system calls causes a decrease in accuracy for trace
lengths less than 500. However, for l ≥ 500, the detection accuracy matches the accuracy achieved
when all the data are used. Therefore, the benefit of ignoring the first 100 calls is only that it
slightly reduces the overhead of data collection. It does not provide any benefit in terms of increased
detection accuracy.
5.4.6 Effects of drift
Malware authors are continually creating new malware samples and modifying existing samples to
add new features, fix bugs, and evade detection. Such incremental changes, referred to as drift,
present a challenge for any detector, which must continually adapt to keep up with the changes.
Changes introduced specifically to evade detection or make future evasion easier are referred to
as adversarial drift [123]. The detection results presented so far in this chapter were achieved
using cross validation with randomly determined training-testing splits. While such results provide
a measure of how well the detector performs against an independent dataset, these results have
no chronological meaning. This section presents a study of detector performance that takes into
account the chronological order in which the malware samples were discovered. The objective is to
characterize the effects of drift on detection accuracy.
For this study, the dates the malware samples were first submitted to the free online virus scan-
ning service VirusTotal1 were used as approximate dates of initial discovery. All of the samples were
first discovered between January 2012 and March 2015. Cross-validation was performed according
to the discovery dates. The detector was trained using all of the malware discovered prior to a
chosen date, and testing was performed on the remaining data. Multiple cross-validation folds were
performed by sliding the date of the split over the data set. For example, in the first fold, only
malware samples discovered before 1 January 2013 were used for training, and the remaining data
were used for testing. In the second fold, samples discovered prior to 1 February 2013 were used
for training and the rest for testing. This process was repeated fifteen times, and the results were
averaged over the folds.
1VirusTotal, http://www.virustotal.com
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Figure 5.7: Detector TPR at FPR= 10−5 as a function of time since training, showing the
effects of drift on detection accuracy over a 12 month period
Figure 5.7 shows the TPR of the LR detector at a fixed FPR of 10−5 versus the number of months
elapsed since training. The results for month zero show the detection performance achieved using
cross-validation on the training set. The remaining results are determined by binning the malware
according to their month of discovery. The results indicate that detection performance gradually
decreases over time. By 12 months, the TPR has decreased by nearly 6.5%. This gradual decrease
in detection performance is the effect of drift, caused primarily by the introduction of new malware
samples against which the detector performed poorly. The comparatively high standard errors on
the measurements compared to month zero are the result of the relatively small sample sizes for the
individual months compared to the training set. In fact, most of the months prior to June 2014 –
when the malware collection efforts intensified – have fewer than 500 malware samples, while most
of the following months have thousands of malware samples.
It is expected that in a production deployment of the detection system, detection models would
be updated periodically to correct for drift. The updated models would likely be generated off-line
by a third party in a laboratory environment and pushed to clients, similar to the way antivirus
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(AV) signatures are currently distributed. The models used for the described detection system have
three advantages over traditional malware signatures.
• The models used by the detector are more concise than the large signature databases used in
AV software.
• Whereas AV signature databases are typically updated multiple times per day, the models
used here would require less frequent updates. For example, if the goal is to stay within 2.5%
of peak performance, the models should be updated every three months.
• The models used in this work can be updated using data collected from production hosts,
reducing the burden on the vendor of the updates to run every newly discovered malware
sample in a laboratory environment.
5.4.7 Error analysis
This section identifies the sources of the detection errors, specifically the types of benign software
responsible for the false positives and types of malware responsible for the false negatives. It also
examines the hosts on which the detection errors occurred. The results presented in this section are
those achieved by the LR detector at a FPR of 10−5.
Seven types of benign software applications were responsible for the false positives, particularly:
• a secure erasure utility,
• a disk defragmentation utility,
• the Windows Defender worker process,
• the Windows narrator,
• two strategy games,
• a component of a graphics editing application, and
• a media player application.
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Table 5.2: ESET family labels of false negatives
category samples
Kryptik 78
Injector 43
AdWare.MultiPlug 36
AdGazelle 28
Softcnapp.C.gen 27
Spy.Banker 24
RiskWare.ShouQu 23
Sality 21
MSIL/Solimba 20
Injector.Autoit 20
Agent 20
AdWare.iBryte 16
Parite 13
Spy.Zbot 12
Sohanad 12
NSIS/TrojanDownloader.Agent 12
MSIL/Kryptik 12
FlyStudio 12
Autoit 12
VB 11
The false positives occurred on six different testbed hosts and one production host. The high
representation of the testbed hosts was caused primarily by the fact that they accounted for a
majority of the collected data. The common feature among the false positives was that they had
relatively low representation in the collected datasets. The cause of the false positives was likely a
lack of training data for similar applications, underscoring the importance of training the detector
with a variety of benign applications to ensure the models cover a wide range of benign behaviors.
With a TPR rate above 98%, the detector provided 1021 false negatives. The false negatives were
studied in terms of their AV labels. According to their Microsoft labels, more than half of the false
negatives were not malicious. Those that were labeled malicious by Microsoft spanned 18 malware
categories and included 106 Trojans, 69 worms, 69 viruses, and 57 Trojan downloaders. According to
their ESET labels, 117 of the false negatives were not malicious. Those that were labeled malicious
by ESET spanned 214 different malware families. Table 5.2 presents the twenty malware families
that appeared most often in the set of false negatives and the number of occurrences of each. These
include multiple adware families, injectors, and a malware family considered riskware, i.e., software
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that is not necessarily malicious. A study of a subset of these samples indicated that they did not
perform any obvious malicious tasks on the testbed. The family with the highest representation in
the set of false positives was Kryptik, a Trojan backdoor. The reason for its high representation in
the set of false positives was primarily its high overall representation, with more than 4,000 samples
included in this study.
5.4.8 Malware comparison
The goal of this section is to characterize the LR 3-gram detector’s performance against specific
malware families. Here, a detector is trained for each malware family and cross-validated against
instances of the same family. Table 5.3 summarizes the experimental results achieved for ESET
malware families. The table shows the TPR achieved by the detector at a fixed FPR of 10−5 against
each malware family and the number of samples in each family. Only families with at least 100
samples are shown, and they are sorted in decreasing order of TPR.
The results in Table 5.3 show that the TPR of the detectors were generally high. The detector
correctly identified every sample of 23 of the listed families, indicated by the TPRs of 1 in the
table. There were also a handful of outliers against which the detector performed relatively poorly.
Among those families were LockScreen, ransomware that displays a password-protected lockscreen,
and the adware program SystemSecurity. Such false negatives are not particularly worrisome, since
these malware samples provide other obvious signs of infection. Among the malware families with
the lowest TPRs were malware droppers and downloaders, families that are loosely-defined or that
involve the execution of other types of malware. It is likely that such families were not accurately
characterized during training, due to their relatively low sample sizes and wide range of functions.
The described malware detection system generally performs very well against well-defined mal-
ware families, but struggles against more loosely-defined families. Given this result, it is likely that
the use of an ensemble of multiple detectors trained on canonical malware families would lead to an
overall improvement in detection accuracy compared to the use of a single malware detector. Such
a detector would likely be able to detect the specific processes created by loosely-defined malware
samples, such as downloaders and droppers.
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Table 5.3: Per-family malware detector performance, showing TPR achieved at 10−5 FPR
every ESET malware family with at least 100 samples
family TPR samples
Mydoom 1.00 1,322
Adware.MultiPlug 1.00 487
MSIL/Solimba 1.00 445
Yuner 1.00 414
Dlhelper.C 1.00 400
AdWare.iBryte 1.00 275
Viking 1.00 274
LunaStorm 1.00 245
Neshta 1.00 181
DownloadAdmin.I 1.00 126
Adware.iBryte 1.00 119
bmMedia 1.00 110
Spy.Qukart 1.00 110
Klez 1.00 106
AdWare.MultiPlug 1.00 1,493
Simda 1.00 576
SoftPulse 1.00 442
Alman 1.00 705
Madang 1.00 699
Injector.Autoit 1.00 546
Packed.ASProtect 1.00 291
TrojanDownloader.Waski 1.00 314
AdWare.LoadMoney 1.00 200
Hupigon 0.99 891
Ramnit 0.99 931
ServStart 0.99 304
Parite 0.99 639
Delf 0.99 1,701
Fynloski 0.99 1,051
Farfli 0.99 653
VB 0.99 621
FirseriaInstaller 0.99 250
PSW.OnLineGames 0.99 965
MSIL/TrjDropper.Binder 0.99 105
Spy.Zbot 0.99 735
family TPR samples
MSIL/Bladabindi 0.99 804
AutoRun.VB 0.99 448
FlyStudio 0.99 576
Injector 0.98 4,454
Spy.Banker 0.98 560
IRCBot 0.98 934
Autoit 0.98 235
Sality 0.98 1,961
MSIL/Injector 0.98 1,467
MSIL/Stimilik 0.98 184
Rbot 0.98 127
Kryptik 0.97 4,088
Wapomi 0.97 280
Packed.Themida 0.97 175
Dorkbot 0.97 186
Agent 0.97 1,189
Spatet 0.97 245
PSW.Fareit 0.96 186
MSIL/Kryptik 0.96 376
unknown.NewHeur PE 0.96 196
Chir 0.96 131
TrojanDownloader.Agent 0.96 525
TrojanDownloader.Small 0.96 267
TrojanDropper.Agent 0.95 154
TrojanDropper.Delf 0.95 121
Neurevt 0.95 108
Adware.SystemSecurity 0.94 110
MSIL/Agent 0.94 147
TrojanDownloader.Banload 0.94 143
LockScreen 0.93 233
MSIL/TrjanDropper.Agent 0.91 122
Virut 0.91 260
Generik 0.90 174
TrojanDownloader.Wauchos 0.89 123
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5.5 Case study
The experimental results in the preceding section were obtained using cross-validation against the
data collected from the testbed and from the home and office environments. These are controlled
environments wherein the processes could be relatively accurately labeled as benign or malicious
in the ground truth. Conversely, the public computer labs present an uncontrolled environment,
where typical users are novices with limited training in security best practices and are provided
privileged access to the hosts. The goal of this case study is to use the models developed from the
controlled environments to detect whether any potentially malicious software executed on the public
computers.
For the case study, the LR detector was used in a manner intended to mimic potential com-
mercial deployment. The detector was trained using the labeled data collected from the controlled
environments, and the detection threshold λ was set based on the detection results achieved using
an independent training set from the same environment. To be consistent with the study in the
previous sections, λ was selected as the threshold that provided the maximum TPR for a fixed FPR
of 10−5. In total, more than 56,000 processes were observed in the public computer labs. Of these
processes, the LR detector labeled 373 processes as potentially malicious. Of the processes labeled
malicious,
• 90 were confirmed to be malicious software. These included multiple families of known adware
programs and browser hijackers, and were observed on three of the hosts.
• 99 were installers for unknown software whose provenance could not be determined.
• 184 appeared to be false positives.
The false positives were composed of many repeated instances of a small number of applications.
The majority (114) of these processes were from bundled software applications pre-installed on the
computers by the hardware vendor. The others included a document viewer, a media player, tax
preparation software, a game used for teaching students how to type, a massively multiplayer online
game, security software, a web browser, and system restore software.
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Some of the aforementioned false positives can be attributed to deficiencies in the training data.
For example, the training set did not include any hardware vendor software or system restore soft-
ware, and contained few instances of security software and games. Others, such as the web browser
false positives, occurred on a host infected with known adware. Therefore, these processes may have
been identified as malware due to malicious browser plugins.
Despite the higher than expected FPR in the case study, the study did have positive takeaways.
First, the study did correctly reveal the presence of malware on the public computers. Furthermore,
multiple malware processes were identified from malware families that were not included in the
malware set used for training. Thus, the case study illustrated that the detector is successful in
identifying new malware families in an independent environment. Finally, the case study illustrated
flaws in the ground truth labeling process and underscored the importance of using a diverse set of
benign software for training.
5.6 Sequential malware detection results
This section presents the sequential detection results achieved using adaptations of Wald’s SPRT
and Page’s CUSUM test. The tests use the probability estimates output by the LR detector to
sequentially compute a decision statistic. To apply the sequential detection techniques, the system
call traces were partitioned block-wise into sub-traces of a fixed length lb. The traces studied in the
previous section, which contained 1,500 system calls each, were partitioned into sub-traces of sizes
ranging from 50 to 750 system calls. Both training and testing were performed block-wise on the
sub-traces, and the decision thresholds were determined experimentally to achieve a desired FPR.
The experimental results of this study are presented in Table 5.4, which shows the results achieved
at a fixed FPR of 10−5 for each sub-trace length lb. The results are presented in terms of the TPR
and ADD of each detector. The ADD is presented as the ADD for positive detections only, i.e., the
number of system calls on average that were observed before the detector indicated that a process was
malicious. This distinction is made to ensure fair comparisons between the two detectors, because
the implementation of Page’s CUSUM considers only the problem of identifying malware, and not
of identifying benign software. The ADD of Wald’s SPRT for negative decisions was much lower
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Table 5.4: Sequential detection results for Page’s CUSUM test and Wald’s SPRT, showing
the average detection delay (ADD) and true positive rate (TPR) at a fixed FPR of 10−5
lb SPRT TPR SPRT ADD CUSUM TPR CUSUM ADD
50 0.81 875 0.72 947
75 0.71 927 0.71 993
100 0.87 881 0.81 949
125 0.86 989 0.81 971
150 0.90 863 0.87 930
200 0.88 874 0.86 907
250 0.91 933 0.87 933
300 0.90 974 0.88 1013
350 0.90 923 0.91 924
375 0.94 912 0.92 960
500 0.94 1030 0.94 1033
750 0.95 1031 0.94 1094
than for positive decisions.
The ADD of the sequential tests was 953 system calls, consistent with the results presented in
Section 5.4.1 that indicated peak detection performance was achieved at around 1000 system calls.
For the system call traces used in this study, 1,000 system calls corresponds to an average execution
time of 205 ms. The ADD of each test was relatively consistent regardless of the choice of the block
size lb. At a fixed FPR of 10
−5, both Page’s CUSUM test and Wald’s SPRT provided similar TPRs.
The highest detection accuracy was achieved for block lengths lb ≥ 500. Shorter block lengths were
less effective primarily because such short system call traces were not particularly informative, as
illustrated in Section 5.4.5. The primary advantage of the sequential detection methods is that they
terminate as soon as enough evidence is collected that a process is malicious. Page’s CUSUM offers
the additional advantage that it is a continuous inspection scheme. That is, it monitors a process
throughout its execution, and can detect the execution of malicious code regardless of when it occurs.
5.7 Conclusions
This section presented four detection algorithms and studied their empirical detection accuracy
under fixed FPR constraints. The empirical results were used to determine the set of algorithms
and parameters that provided the highest detection accuracy, guiding the design of a malicious
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process detection system. Logistic regression (LR) was chosen because it provided the highest
detection accuracy and provided probability estimates as outputs. The selected feature extraction
techniques included information retrieval, feature selection, and feature scaling techniques. The
selected techniques used
• ordered 3-grams and trace lengths l ≥ 1000 for information retrieval;
• a subset of 4,000 3-grams chosen using RFE for feature selection; and
• logarithmic frequency, IDF transformation, and L2 normalization for feature scaling.
The selected detector achieved a TPR exceeding 0.95 at a FPR of 10−5. Experimental results
demonstrated the detector to be robust to drift and highly effective against specific malware families.
A continuous inspection scheme using Page’s CUSUM test enabled the rapid detection of malicious
behaviors occurring at any time during the execution of a process.
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Chapter 6: Malicious Process Classification
This chapter addresses the third major challenge of this thesis, that of classifying new malicious
processes according to their behavioral similarity to known malware. Classification refers to the
process of identifying the malware category or malware family to which a malicious process belongs.
The malware classifier studied in this section uses the same system call trace data used for detection
and performs classification as soon as a malicious process is detected. The outputs of the classifier
are intended to guide mitigation and post-mortem analysis. Furthermore, the classifier outputs can
be combined with other classification techniques to aid in detailed malware analyses [26]. The two
primary challenges in malware classification are
• determining a set of techniques to quickly and accurately classify malicious processes using the
same system call traces used for detection, and
• identifying a set of ground truth labels to use for training and testing.
To address the first challenge, Section 6.1 presents five classification algorithms selected for their
previously demonstrated effectiveness in both document and malware classification. Section 6.2
describes the techniques used to evaluate the classifiers, and Section 6.3 presents the experimental
results. The second challenge arises from the inconsistency and incompleteness of existing malware
labeling systems. Since there is no universally accepted malware labeling scheme, Section 6.3.1
explores the use of multiple ground truth labeling schemes derived from antivirus (AV) signatures.
6.1 Malware classification algorithms
The classification techniques considered in this chapter are used in a supervised learning context,
wherein the classification models are learned from labeled training data. This chapter considers
five classification algorithms, the first two of which are multi-class implementations of detection
algorithms presented in Chapter 5. The classification algorithms are
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• a multi-class implementation of the logistic regression (LR) algorithm (Section 6.1.1);
• na¨ıve Bayes, a multi-class implementation of the log-likelihood ratio test (LLRT) (Section 6.1.2);
• random forests of decision trees (Section 6.1.3);
• a nearest neighbors classifier (Section 6.1.4); and
• a nearest centroid classifier (Section 6.1.5).
6.1.1 Multi-class logistic regression (LR)
The LR training and testing algorithms described in Section 5.1.4 are designed for a binary decision
task. Classification is a multi-class problem, wherein the goal is to identify to which of many
families or categories a malware processes belongs. This study uses a multi-class implementation
of LR known as the one-versus-all (OVA) approach [124]. The OVA approach treats the K-class
classification problem as a collection of binary detection problems. The classifier uses K detectors,
one for each of the malware classes. Each detector is trained to differentiate between the malware
belonging to a specific malware class Ck and malware belonging to all other classes Ck¯.
The classifier selects the class with the highest decision statistic. Given pCk(xˆ), the probability
that a process with feature vector xˆ comes from a malware sample of class Ck, and pCk¯(xˆ), the
probability that it does not come from class Ck, the OVA classifier selects the most likely class Cˆk
as
Cˆk = arg max
Ck
log
(
pCk(xˆ)
pCk¯(xˆ)
)
. (6.1)
The LR classifier is considered here because it offered the best performance of the four detection algo-
rithms considered in the previous chapter, because of its computational simplicity during detection,
and because of its efficient training process.
6.1.2 Na¨ıve Bayes
Like the LR detector, the LLRT described in Section 5.1.2 is also a binary detection algorithm. The
multi-class implementation of the LLRT is commonly referred to as the na¨ıve Bayes algorithm, as it
bases its detection thresholds on error costs and prior probabilities [116]. The classifier is based on
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Bayes’ rule, which states that the posterior probability is proportional to the product of the prior
probability and likelihood. That is, the posterior probability P (Ck|xˆ) that a process comes from
class Ck given its feature vector xˆ is proportional to the prior probability P (Ck) that a malware
sample is from class Ck and the class-conditional likelihood of xˆ,
P (Ck|xˆ) ∝ P (Ck)× PXˆ|Ck(xˆ) . (6.2)
The na¨ıve Bayes classifier computes the most likely class label Cˆk of a feature vector xˆ as the class
with the highest posterior probability
Cˆk = arg max
Ck
P (Ck)× PXˆ|Ck(xˆ) . (6.3)
For this study, the prior probabilities P (Ck) are estimated from the training data.
Two different implementations of the na¨ıve Bayes classifier are considered in this work: a multino-
mial and a Gaussian implementation. The multinomial approach models the probabilities PXˆ|Ck(xˆ)
using a multinomial distribution and is used with the term frequency – inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF) transformed feature data. The Gaussian approach models the posterior probabilities
PXˆ|Ck(xˆ) using a Gaussian distribution and is used with the singular value decomposition (SVD)
and linear discriminant analysis (LDA) transformed feature data. Although it performed poorly
for malware detection, the na¨ıve Bayes algorithm is considered for classification because of its com-
putational simplicity during training and testing and because related work has demonstrated its
usefulness for malware classification.
6.1.3 Random forests
The random forests algorithm uses a collection of binary decision trees for classification. Given a
the system call trace of a malware sample with a feature vector xˆ, a binary decision tree classifies
a process through a sequence of simple threshold tests. The random forest classifier is an ensemble
learner that trains a collection of decision trees to use for classification. The random forests algorithm
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works by selecting the majority class Cˆk output by the collection.
A decision tree comprises of a set of nodes and edges. The interior nodes of the tree correspond
to simple threshold tests, each of which is performed against a single scalar feature xˆi ∈ xˆ. During
detection, the tree is traversed by evaluating the threshold test at each node, moving to the node’s
left child if xˆi ≤ λ, or right child if xˆi > λ. The tree traversal continues until a leaf node is
reached. Each leaf node of the tree represents a predicted malware class Cˆk, which is the output of
the classifier.
The classification and regression trees (CART) decision tree algorithm was used in this study
to train the decision tree classifier [125]. The CART algorithm builds decision trees recursively,
starting at the root node of the tree. It begins by considering all of the malware samples and their
corresponding labels and feature vectors xˆ. It selects a feature xi ∈ xˆ and a threshold λ that divide
the data into two sets, those samples that exceed the threshold and those that do not. The CART
algorithm seeks the feature and threshold that cause similar malware samples to be grouped together
after the split. To achieve this goal, the feature and threshold are selected such that they minimize
the weighted average of the Gini impurity of the resulting sets. The Gini impurity considers a set
of feature vectors X each belonging to one of K classes, denoted Ck. Given probabilities p(Ck) that
a malware sample belong to class Ck estimated from the training data, the Gini impurity G of a set
X is
G(X ) =
K∑
k=1
p(Ck) (1− p(Ck)) . (6.4)
The minimum Gini impurity (0) is achieved when a set contains only malware of a single class.
The feature and threshold are chosen for the root node divide the malware into two disjoint
sets at the two child nodes. The process is repeated for each child node, and continues until a
node contains only malware of the same class. Such nodes becomes leaf nodes of the decision tree.
The algorithm terminates based on tunable parameters that determine the complexity of the tree,
including the minimum number of training instances assigned to each leaf node and the minimum
number of training instances required to split a node.
Decision tree models were selected for the white box decision models they provide. The random
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forest classifier [126], was selected due to the tendency of decision trees to overfit the training data.
To ensure diversity in the decision trees, the decision tree training algorithm is modified to consider
a only randomly selected subset of features at each node.
6.1.4 Nearest neighbors
The k-nearest neighbors classifier uses the entire training set X as its model [113]. For detection,
it computes the Euclidean distance between a vector xˆ and every vector in the training set X . The
vectors in the training set nearest to xˆ are considered its nearest neighbors. The output of the
classifier is the class with the highest representation in the set of nearest neighbors.
The nearest neighbor classifier is advantageous because of its simplicity and because it can realize
complicated decision surfaces. However, its usefulness is limited to low-dimensional datasets due to
the difficulty of comparing the distances among points in high dimensional space. Feature reduction
techniques are typically used with the nearest neighbors classifier to project high-dimensional data
onto a lower-dimensional space. In this study, SVD and LDA are used for feature reduction. Since it
stores the entire training set as its model, the memory and computational complexity of the nearest
neighbors classifier are too high to be considered for widespread deployment. Rather, the nearest
neighbor classifier is considered here primarily for comparison.
6.1.5 Nearest centroid
The nearest centroid classifier models each malware class as its centroid, i.e., the average of its feature
vectors [127]. Classification is performed by computing the Euclidean distance from a feature vector
xˆ to each centroid. The output of the classifier is the class label of the centroid nearest to the vector.
The nearest centroid classifier is advantageous because of its lower model and computational
complexity compared to the nearest neighbor classifier. Whereas the model storage and compu-
tational complexity of the nearest neighbor classifier is O(N), where N is the number of training
samples, the storage and computational complexity of the nearest centroid classifier is O(K), where
K is the number of classes, and K  N . However, the nearest centroid classifier assumes convexity
of its classes and equal variance along all dimensions. Therefore, it performs poorly when the data
Chapter 6: Malware Classification 6.1 Malware classification algorithms
98
points within the classes do not form non-overlapping convex sets or when the feature variances
differ significantly. Like the nearest neighbor classifier, the nearest centroid classifier is typically
used with feature reduction techniques, such as the SVD and LDA transformations considered in
this study.
6.2 Malware classifier evaluation
The techniques described in this section were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the selected
malware classification algorithms. One set of techniques is used to evaluate classification accuracy
on a per-class basis, while the other is used to asses the overall accuracy of a classifier. For per-class
accuracy, this study considers precision, recall, and F1 scores. For overall accuracy, it considers
average F1 scores and κ statistics. These per-class techniques consider the following four quantities
for each class Ck.
• FPCk is the number of false positives, i.e., the number of processes incorrectly classified as
belonging to class Ck.
• TPCk is the number of true positives, i.e., the number of processes correctly classified as
belonging to class Ck.
• FNCk is the number of false negatives, i.e., the number of processes in Ck incorrectly classified
as belonging to a different class.
• TNCk is the number of true negatives, i.e., the number of processes not in Ck correctly classified
as not belonging to class Ck.
6.2.1 Precision
The precision of a class Ck is the fraction of processes classified as Ck that belong to Ck,
PrecisionCk =
TPCk
TPCk + FPCk
. (6.5)
The precision provides a measurement of the relevance of the positive classifications. A precision of
1 indicates that the classifier is always correct when it classifies a process as belonging to class Ck,
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whereas a precision of 0 indicates it is never correct when it does so.
6.2.2 Recall
The recall of a class Ck is the fraction of the processes belonging to Ck in the ground truth that are
correctly classified as Ck,
RecallCk =
TPCk
TPCk + FNCk
. (6.6)
The recall provides a measurement of the sensitivity of the classifier. A recall of 1 indicates that
every instance of class Ck was correctly classified, whereas a recall of 0 indicates that every instance
of Ck was incorrectly classified.
6.2.3 F1 score
The F1 score of a class Ck is the harmonic mean of the precision and recall,
F1, Ck = 2
PrecisionCk ×RecallCk
PrecisionCk +RecallCk
. (6.7)
An F1 score of 0 indicates 0 recall or 0 precision, whereas an F1 score of 1 indicates perfect recall
and precision. In this study, F1 score is used to evaluate classification accuracy both per-class and
as an aggregate measure over all the classes. To evaluate the overall F1 score, the individual class
scores are averaged over the classes. Three different averaging techniques are considered.
Micro-averaged F1 score: Each process is given equal weight, and the average is computed over
the individual processes. This provides an indicator of how effective the classifier is on large
classes, since classes with higher representation receive the most weight.
Macro-averaged F1 score: Each class is given equal weight, and the average is the average of the
F1 scores from all the classes. This provides an indicator of how effective the classifier is on
small classes, since all classes are treated equally.
Weighted F1 score: Each class is weighted inversely by its support in the ground truth. This
approach is intended to give a balanced measure of the F1 score when classes are not balanced,
as is the case in this work.
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All three averaging techniques are considered because the classes of the malware samples used in
this study are not balanced. By including all three values, the performance of the classifiers against
small classes, large classes, and on average can be studied.
6.2.4 Cohen’s κ statistic
The F1 score does not take into account the effects of chance on classification performance. To
address this concern, this study also uses Cohen’s κ statistic for classifier evaluation [128]. The κ
statistic is intended for the comparison of two different sets of class assignments and provides a
measure of the agreement between the sets. Here, the κ statistic is used to measure the agreement
between classification results and the ground truth. The κ statistic compares the accuracy of a
classifier to the accuracy of a random classifier operating on the same dataset. The κ statistic
compares the observed accuracy of a classifier to the expected accuracy of a random classifier. The
observed accuracy of a classifier is the fraction of processes it correctly classifies,
ACCobserved =
1
card(X )
∑
Ck
TPCk . (6.8)
The expected accuracy of a classifier is computed by estimating the probability of occurrence of
each class separately for the ground truth and classification results. The expected accuracy assumes
the class assignments made by both the classifier and the ground truth are randomly determined
according to the estimated probabilities of each class. Given pcr(Ck) as the probability of appearance
of each class Ck in the classification results, and pgt(Ck) as the probability of appearance of each
class Ck in the ground truth, the expected accuracy is
ACCexpected =
∑
Ck
pcr(Ck)× pgt(Ck) . (6.9)
The κ statistic is computed from the observed and expected accuracy as
κ =
ACCobserved −ACCexpected
1−ACCexpected . (6.10)
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The κ values range from −1 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect agreement, −1 indicating perfect dis-
agreement, and 0 indicating the results are not discernible from random chance. The κ statistic is
useful in this study because the class imbalance of the malware samples (especially for categorical
labels) contributes to a high expected accuracy of a random classifier.
6.3 Experimental classification results
This section presents experimental results achieved using the classifiers described in Section 6.1 and
evaluation techniques described in Section 6.2. The results were obtained through cross-validation
performed on the set of processes collected from the execution of more than 55,000 distinct malware
samples. Among the experimental results described in this section are
• a comparison of the classification accuracy afforded by multiple ground truth labeling schemes
(Section 6.3.1);
• an evaluation and comparison of the five classification algorithms (Section 6.3.2);
• analysis of per-category and per-family classification accuracy (Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4); and
• a feature selection study, comparing the sets of features chosen for detection and classification
(Section 6.3.5).
The outcome of this section is the design of a malware classification system, with techniques and
parameters chosen experimentally to maximize its accuracy against the malware samples considered
for this study.
6.3.1 Ground truth comparison
The lack of a universal malware naming scheme, combined with the incompleteness and inconsistency
of existing naming schemes, complicates the problem of automatic classification. In particular, it
raises the question: What are the relevant malware classes against which a classifier should be
evaluated? This section presents a study of the accuracy of the LR classifier against 27 different
ground truth labeling schemes derived from 16 different AV vendors’ labels. The ground truth
labeling schemes are listed in Table 6.1, identified by the AV labels from which they are derived and
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Table 6.1: Classification ground truth performance comparison for the LR classifier
Ground truth classes processes κ F1 (micro) F1 (macro) F1 (weighted)
AntiVir-category 16 62,398 0.74 0.84 0.51 0.83
AntiVir-family 167 59,478 0.59 0.62 0.40 0.61
Avast-category 12 78,147 0.51 0.64 0.40 0.67
Avast-family 192 75,146 0.50 0.52 0.38 0.53
DrWeb-category 9 74,256 0.61 0.77 0.41 0.79
DrWeb-family 226 70,857 0.62 0.62 0.44 0.64
Emsisoft-category 32 77,284 0.49 0.57 0.30 0.59
Emsisoft-family 258 68,434 0.47 0.48 0.32 0.50
ESETNOD32-family 251 75,079 0.68 0.69 0.48 0.70
FSecure-category 46 75,726 0.58 0.66 0.47 0.66
FSecure-family 172 72,331 0.55 0.57 0.39 0.57
GData-category 26 81,038 0.52 0.60 0.32 0.62
GData-family 218 72,807 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.51
Ikarus-category 41 75,429 0.54 0.58 0.40 0.60
Ikarus-family 419 67,937 0.55 0.56 0.38 0.55
K7AntiVirus-category 14 73,229 0.56 0.66 0.51 0.67
Kaspersky-family 259 69,325 0.53 0.54 0.40 0.55
Kaspersky-category 30 72,933 0.56 0.61 0.39 0.63
McAfee-category 111 79,477 0.55 0.57 0.48 0.58
Microsoft-family 263 61,883 0.72 0.73 0.53 0.73
Microsoft-category 19 66,930 0.71 0.75 0.50 0.76
Panda-category 8 71,352 0.60 0.76 0.51 0.76
Panda-family 98 68,838 0.56 0.60 0.47 0.60
Symantec-category 22 68,019 0.52 0.62 0.41 0.62
TrendMicro-family 207 57,950 0.50 0.52 0.40 0.52
Vipre-category 28 77,032 0.58 0.71 0.39 0.74
Vipre-family 185 74,713 0.52 0.58 0.41 0.61
whether they are category or family labels. For example, the AntiVir-category labels are categorical
labels derived from the AntiVir AV labels. For each of the ground truth labeling schemes, the table
lists the number of classes and total number of processes included in the labeling scheme. For each
set of labeling schemes, only malware samples positively identified as malicious by the corresponding
AV vendor were considered. Furthermore, only classes containing at least ten malware samples were
considered to ensure meaningful cross-validation results.
Table 6.1 presents the performance of the LR classifier in terms of both its κ and F1 scores.
The results provide two useful insights into the performance of the classifier. First, the macro-
averaged F1 score is consistently low, indicating the classifier performs poorly against small classes
regardless of the ground truth. Second, the κ scores, micro-averaged F1 scores, and weighted F1
scores varied significantly based on the chosen ground truth. This observation indicates that system
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call 3-gram features characterize certain ground truth labeling schemes better than others. The
highest performing categorical ground truth labels were those derived from the AntiVir and Microsoft
labels, while the highest performing family ground truth labels were those derived from the ESET
and Microsoft labels. The high classification performance of the AntiVir labels was attributed to a
single class accounting for the vast majority of the samples. Therefore, only the ESET and Microsoft
labels are considered for the remainder of this study.
6.3.2 Classifier comparison
This section compares the accuracy of the five classifiers described in Section 6.1 using three different
feature extraction strategies.
• The first strategy (TF-IDF) considers the best performing feature set from the detection
results, namely logarithmic frequencies, inverse document frequency (IDF) transformation,
and L2 scaling.
• The second strategy (TF-IDF, SVD) combines the first with SVD, wherein the TF-IDF trans-
formed features are projected onto their first 500 singular values.
• The third strategy (TF-IDF, SVD, LDA) combines the second with LDA, wherein the SVD
transformed features are projected onto K − 1 features selected using LDA.
While the LR classifier is evaluated using all three feature extraction strategies, the other classifiers
are evaluated using only a subset of the techniques. The nearest centroid, nearest neighbor, and
decision tree algorithms do not consider the TF-IDF features because of the high dimensionality of
the data and the computational complexity of the algorithms. The multinomial and Gaussian na¨ıve
Bayes are restricted only to the feature sets that can be described by the multinomial and Gaussian
distribution models, respectively. Therefore, the former uses only the TF-IDF data and the latter
uses only the SVD and LDA transformed feature data.
Table 6.2 summarizes the performance of each classifier and feature extraction strategy combi-
nation in terms of its κ statistic and averaged F1 scores. Among the worst performers were the the
na¨ıve Bayes and nearest centroid classifiers. The na¨ıve Bayes classifier performed poorly because the
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Table 6.2: Classifier and feature extraction comparison
detector feature extraction κ F1 (micro) F1 (macro) F1 (weighted)
LR TF-IDF 0.73 0.73 0.55 0.73
LR TF-IDF, SVD 0.60 0.61 0.35 0.62
LR TF-IDF, SVD, LDA 0.66 0.66 0.44 0.66
nearest centroid TF-IDF, SVD 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.34
nearest centroid TF-IDF, SVD, LDA 0.55 0.55 0.32 0.58
nearest neighbor TF-IDF, SVD 0.72 0.72 0.47 0.71
nearest neighbor TF-IDF, SVD, LDA 0.73 0.73 0.49 0.72
random forests TF-IDF, SVD 0.73 0.73 0.52 0.72
random forests TF-IDF, SVD, LDA 0.72 0.73 0.50 0.71
multinomial na¨ıve Bayes TF-IDF 0.42 0.43 0.06 0.34
Gaussian na¨ıve Bayes TF-IDF, SVD 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.52
Gaussian na¨ıve Bayes TF-IDF, SVD, LDA 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.52
assumed probability models were inaccurate and tended to overfit the training data. The nearest
centroid classifier performed poorly because the feature data did not form non-overlapping convex
sets. The nearest centroid detector’s performance improves significantly when LDA is used, because
the resulting sets have higher separation. However, it still significantly underperforms the highest
performing classifiers.
The highest performers were the nearest neighbor, random forest, and LR classifiers. The first two
performed equally well whether SVD or LDA was used. The high accuracy of the nearest neighbor
classifier underscores the weakness of its counterpart, the nearest centroid classifier. Although the
two use the similar distance metric-based algorithms, the simplistic model and convexity assumption
of the nearest centroid classifier causes its poor performance. The relatively poor performance of
the LR classifier with feature reduction indicates that the feature data are not linearly separable in
the reduced feature space. The nearest neighbor and random forests classifiers achieved accurate
results due to the nonlinear decision surfaces they are able to realize.
For a production deployment, the LR classifier is preferred to the random forests and nearest
neighbor algorithms. The LR classifier provides lower training complexity than the random forest
classifier and provides an efficient mechanism for re-training the models as new malware samples
are discovered. The LR classifier also provides a lower testing complexity than the nearest neighbor
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Figure 6.1: Classifier confusion matrix for Microsoft category ground truth labels, showing
the fraction of samples in each class indicated by the row labels classified as the column labels
classifier, making it more desirable for deployment on production hosts.
6.3.3 Category-level classification results
The preceding sections provided a high-level overview of classification performance in terms of κ
statistics and averaged F1 scores. This section provides analysis of per-category accuracy of the LR
classifier using the Microsoft category labels. The experimental results are presented in terms of the
classifier’s confusion matrix. The confusion matrix is a K ×K matrix, wherein the rows represent
the ground truth labels and the columns represent the classifier outputs. Traditionally, the entries of
a confusion matrix are the number of instances of the row class assigned to the column class by the
classifier. The diagonal entries indicate correctly classified instances, while the non-diagonal entries
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indicate incorrectly classified instances. Figure 6.1 shows the confusion matrix for the LR classifier
using the Microsoft family labels. Since the classes are not balanced, the entries of the matrix are
the percentage of the row class assigned to the column class by the classifier. For example, more
than 90% of the worms were correctly classified as worms, whereas less than 20% of the monitoring
tools were correctly classified as monitoring tools.
The confusion matrix shows two dark vertical lines in the backdoor and Trojan columns, in-
dicating that many malware samples from multiple categories were misclassified as backdoors and
Trojans. The backdoor misclassifications were caused by malware samples in other classes provid-
ing backdoors and backdoor-like functionality. For example, many malware samples used in this
study notified remote servers when a host is infected, sent confidential data to remote servers, or
requested commands and configuration information from remote servers. Conversely, the Trojan
misclassifications were caused by the abundance of Trojans in the training set and the wide variety
of functionality they exhibited. The Trojans used in this study provided functions that overlapped
with the majority of the other malware classes. Many Trojans included backdoor, distributed denial
of service (DDoS), password stealing, and other malicious functions.
The confusion matrix in Figure 6.1 also shows a dark horizontal line on the software bundler
row, which indicates that many software bundler samples were misclassified. The software bundler
samples were most often misclassified as various types of Trojans. This is also likely due to the
nature of a the software bundlers, which are legitimate software that also install malware. Whereas
a Trojan is disguised as legitimate software, a software bundler actually contains legitimate software
as the delivery mechanism for the malware. The misclassifications can be attributed to this similarity
in function and to the fact that Trojans outnumbered software bundlers in the malware set.
There were two other categories for which the classifier performed particularly poorly, hack tools
and monitoring tools. Hack tools include key generators and password crackers. Such tools are often
distributed with other bundled malware, which likely led to the misclassifications. Monitoring tools
are commercial programs that monitor computer usage, and can include keyloggers and password
stealers. Monitoring tools are similar to Trojans and Trojan Droppers, because they typically are
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bundled with and installed alongside other software. They are similar to spyware because they
transmit collected data over the network. Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that
overlapping malware functionality and broadly-defined malware families are the primary cause of
category-level misclassifications.
6.3.4 Family-level classification results
Whereas the previous section characterized the performance of the LR classifier using the Microsoft
category labels, this section characterizes its performance using the Microsoft family labels. In this
section, the experimental results are presented in terms of the precision, recall, and F1 score for
each of the malware categories in the ground truth. The results presented in Table 6.3 show the
precision, recall, F1 score, and number of instances of the 25 malware families with the highest F1
scores, and the 25 malware families with the lowest F1 scores. Among the best-performing families
are those with thousands of instances, whereas the poorest performers have at most 69 instances.
These results are consistent with those presented in Section 6.3.2, which indicated that the classifier
performs well for classes with many instances and poorly for classes with few instances.
Generally, the best performing families were those from narrowly defined malware categories, such
as Viruses, worms, exploits, password stealers (PWSs), and backdoors. Conversely, the worst per-
forming families were those from more broadly defined categories, particularly Trojans. Furthermore,
some of the poorly performing families are also broadly defined. For example, Trojan.Keylogger,
TrojanDropper.VB, and Trojan.Bumat!rts are generic families for keyloggers, Trojan droppers, and
Trojans. In contrast, the highest performing families are typically very narrowly defined. For ex-
ample, the Worm.Klez definition specifies the registry entries and files modified by the malware, its
interaction with other malware and AV software, how it searches for email addresses, the contents
of the emails it sends, how it propagates, and the security vulnerabilities it exploits.
One way to account for varying class sizes when training a classifier is to weight the classes
inversely based on their representation in the training set. Rare classes are oversampled to even
the class distributions and ensure that the classifier is not biased toward classes with higher repre-
sentation. For comparison, two versions of the LR classifier were trained, one weighting the classes
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Table 6.3: Per-family classifier precision, recall, and F1 scores for the malware families with
the highest and lowest F1 scores
Family Precision Recall F1 score Instances
Virus.Nabucur 1 1 1 1652
Worm.Klez 1 1 1 218
Trojan.Recal 1 1 1 331
Worm.Ganelp 1 1 1 24
Worm.Fesber 1 1 1 702
Worm.Dumpy 1 1 1 18
Worm.Mydoom 0.99 1 0.99 1985
Backdoor.Wabot 0.98 0.99 0.99 324
TrojanDownloader.Seimon 0.98 1 0.99 47
TrojanDropper.Loring 0.97 0.99 0.98 706
Virus.Madang 0.98 0.97 0.98 703
Worm.VB 0.97 0.99 0.98 2423
TrojanDownloader.Ogimant 0.99 0.98 0.98 1202
Worm.Krol 0.95 0.98 0.97 43
Exploit.RpcDcom 0.93 1 0.96 25
Trojan.Startpage 0.96 0.96 0.96 921
PWS.Uosproy 0.95 0.98 0.96 309
Worm.Benjamin 0.96 0.96 0.96 24
Trojan.Phishbank 0.92 0.98 0.95 198
Backdoor.Small 0.93 0.94 0.94 327
Virus.Ipamor 1 0.88 0.94 17
Worm.Lightmoon 0.89 1 0.94 65
TrojanDownloader.Kanav 0.89 0.98 0.94 59
Worm.SillyFDC 0.89 0.99 0.94 89
Virus.Ramnit 0.99 0.87 0.93 2983
...
Ransom.Dircrypt 0.08 0.11 0.09 28
Backdoor.Bergat 0.27 0.05 0.09 55
Ransom.Urausy 0.05 0.14 0.08 28
Trojan.Rimecud 0.05 0.29 0.08 17
TrojanDropper.Cutwail 0.07 0.1 0.08 10
TrojanDownloader.Renos 0.07 0.07 0.07 14
Trojan.Agent 0.05 0.14 0.07 28
Trojan.Meredrop 0.07 0.07 0.07 41
Trojan.Sisproc 0.06 0.06 0.06 32
PWS.Ldpinch 0.06 0.05 0.06 20
TrojanDropper.VB 0.04 0.07 0.05 68
TrojanSpy.VB 0.03 0.15 0.05 20
Trojan.Bumat!rts 0.03 0.04 0.04 69
Trojan.Sisron!gmb 0.04 0.04 0.04 46
Trojan.Nedsym 0.03 0.06 0.04 16
Trojan.Orsam!rts 0.02 0.05 0.03 44
TrojanDownloader.Umbald 0.06 0.02 0.03 41
Trojan.Anomaly 0 0 0 42
Trojan.Napolar 0 0 0 14
Trojan.Yakad 0 0 0 24
Trojan.Comame 0 0 0 23
Trojan.Rimod 0 0 0 16
TrojanSpy.Keylogger 0 0 0 62
Trojan.Anaki 0 0 0 21
TrojanDownloader.Delf 0 0 0 13
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Figure 6.2: Effects of feature selection on classification accuracy, showing the κ statistic and
weighted F1 scores of the classifier versus the number of features selected using recursive feature
elimination (RFE)
inversely based on their representation and the other using the training-data without modification.
The two versions of the classifier provided nearly identical results, including the same κ and weighted
F1 scores. The similarity of the two classifiers indicate that the size of the samples was not biasing
the classifier. Rather, the low precision and recall of the worst-performing classes in Table 6.3 were
likely caused by broadly defined malware families, mislabeled ground truth, and a lack of enough
samples to accurately characterize the families. Mislabeling may have occurred in the ground truth
where malware samples installed additional samples from other families. However, due to limitations
in the testing platform, the installed malware samples shared the ground truth labels of their parent
malware, even when they belonged to a different family.
6.3.5 Feature selection
RFE was used with the LR classifier to identify the most informative 3-grams for the classification
task. Figure 6.2 shows the cross validation results of RFE, showing the κ statistic and weighted
F1 scores for the classifier versus the number of chosen features. Similar to the detection results
presented in the previous chapter, the classification accuracy increases rapidly approaching 1000
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features and levels out as the number of features increases. The maximum classification κ and F1
scores occur at 8000 features, much higher than the maximum detection accuracy, which occurred
at 3000 features. This result indicates that more features are required for the classification than are
required for detection.
A comparison of the 4000 highest ranked classification features and the 4000 features chosen
for detection indicates 34% overlap. The overlap indicates that many of the same features used to
distinguish malware from benign software are also useful for distinguishing among different classes
of benign software. When only the 4000 features used for detection are used for classification, the
LR classifier achieves a κ and weighted F1 score of 0.70 and 0.71, respectively. This corresponds to
a 4.1% decrease in classification accuracy when compared to the LR classifier when all the features
are used.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter explored the use of multiple classification algorithms, feature extraction strategies,
and ground truth labeling schemes for malware classification. Through experimental evaluation,
it demonstrated that decision tree, nearest neighbor, and LR classifiers outperformed naive Bayes
and nearest centroid classifiers. Since the goal of this study was to identify those techniques best
suited for production deployment, the LR classifier was selected for its comparatively low model
and computational complexities. However, the LR classifier requires a larger feature set than the
detector to achieve maximum accuracy. In practice, the set of features used by the detector and
classifier would be expanded to afford both high detection and high classification accuracy. The
results presented in this section also demonstrate that, among the studied malware labeling systems,
the ESET and Microsoft naming systems afforded the highest classification accuracy. The classifier
performed best against well-defined malware families from those labeling systems, and worst against
broadly defined malware families and categories with few training instances.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
This study sought to determine the most effective feature extraction, detection, and classification
techniques to use for the detection and classification of malicious processes based on their system
call traces. The goal of this study was to identify techniques that were ‘lightweight’ enough and that
exhibited a low enough false positive rate (FPR) to be useful in production environments.
7.1 System design
Through experimental evaluation, this study identified the set of techniques that provided the best
detection performance at a fixed FPR of 10−5 and the highest classification accuracy. The best
performing feature extraction techniques were
• using a minimum system call trace length of l = 1,000;
• using a bag-of-ordered-3-grams representation to represent system call traces;
• using a subset of 8,000 ordered 3-grams chosen using recursive feature elimination (RFE); and
• performing feature scaling using term frequency – inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) trans-
formation with logarithmic term frequencies and L2 normalization.
For detection, the logistic regression (LR) and support vector machine (SVM) algorithms of-
fered the highest accuracy, outperforming a signature-based detector and log-likelihood ratio test
(LLRT). The LR detector was chosen because its probability estimates enable its integration with
the two sequential detection procedures considered in this study, Wald’s sequential probability ratio
test (SPRT) and Page’s cumulative sum (CUSUM) test. Of the two sequential procedures, Page’s
CUSUM test is preferred because it enables the continuous inspection processes throughout their
execution, and can detect latent malware that delay the execution of their malicious code.
For classification, the random forest, nearest neighbor, and LR algorithms provided the highest
accuracy, outperforming na¨ıve Bayes and a nearest centroid classifier. The LR algorithm was chosen
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Figure 7.1: Block diagram of malware detection and classification system showing chosen
feature extraction, detection, and classification techniques
over the nearest neighbor methods for its lower memory and computational complexity during testing
and chosen over the random forests because of its lower memory and computational complexity
during training.
A block diagram of the complete malware detection and classification system is provided in
Figure 7.1. The figure shows the four major components of the system, the System Call Service
(SCS), feature extractor, detector, and classifier, in gray. The SCS outputs system call traces which
the feature extractor processes and represents as feature vectors xˆ. The feature vectors are processed
by the detector and classifier, which provide outputs indicating the suspected family of any detected
malicious processes. The specific algorithms and parameters used by each component are indicated
in the block diagram.
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7.2 Summary of system operation
The operation of the detection and classification system is summarized by the flow chart in Figure 7.2.
The flow chart shows the entire detection and classification process performed by the system as it
monitors a process. The first row of the flow chart depicts the feature extraction loop. In this loop,
the system waits for system call events to arrive from the process and counts the occurrences of
the system call 3-grams. This process continues until the desired number of system calls lb have
been observed. Next, the feature extraction process is completed using TF-IDF transformation. The
resulting feature vector xˆ is used for detection. From the output Λ of the LR detector, the sequential
decision statistic Λi is computed as the cumulative sum of the LR outputs. If the decision statistic
exceeds the detection threshold λ, the system performs classification using the saved feature vectors
and the LR classifier. The classifiers outputs the malware family to which the malicious process
most likely belongs. Otherwise, the detector re-enters the feature extraction loop and continues
monitoring the process.
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7.3 Discussions
Detection
This study sought to address two perceived shortcoming in the literature in behavioral malware
detection. First, it sought to address conflicting claims regarding the effectiveness of proposed
behavioral malware detection techniques. Particularly, it sought to address conflicting claims about
the effectiveness of system call frequencies and sequences as feature sets for malware. Further,
it sought to address conflicting claims regarding the usefulness of signature-based and statistical
detection algorithms. In both cases, these claims were addressed by evaluating the effectiveness of
such techniques against a common dataset. This study explored the feature space in which system
call traces can be represented, providing empirical results to evaluate the discrimination afforded by
each representation.
Second, this study sought to address the apparent lack of a study of behavioral malware detection
performance at very low FPRs. Empirical evaluation of the detectors was performed using a set of 4
million processes and 55,000 malware samples. This study revealed that high detection accuracy was
possible at a FPR as low as 10−5, identifying the set of feature extraction and detection techniques
that could be used to achieve such accuracy.
The method by which the system call traces of malware and benign processes used in this study
were collected is also one of the main contributions of this thesis. Instead of executing malware
in a specialized sandbox environment, malware were executed on live hosts configured to mimic
production environments. Furthermore, the same techniques were used to collect benign process
traces both on the same hosts as the malware and in production environments. This approach was
used to prevent bias in the detection results arising from the use of specialized environments.
The majority of the malware samples in this study were detected in their early stages of execution.
If the techniques described in this thesis were to be widely adopted, the most common form of evasion
used by malware authors would likely be to delay the malicious tasks that lead to positive detections.
To address this concern, this study presented a sequential malware detection procedure adapted from
Page’s CUSUM test. The proposed sequential detection procedure is a continuous inspection scheme
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that monitors each process for the duration of its execution. Thus, the test can detect malicious
behaviors regardless of when they occur. This sequential malware detection procedure might also
prove useful in detecting other types of faults and intrusions that do not necessarily occur at the
beginning of a process’s execution.
Classification
For malware classification, the contributions of this study were two-fold. First, it showed that clas-
sification could be achieved using the same set of system call 3-gram features used for malware
detection. This enables classification to be performed immediately after a malware sample is de-
tected, without needing to perform any additional data collection. Furthermore, the computationally
simple algorithms used for classification enable rapid classification, even on low-end hardware. Sec-
ond, it showed that the ground truth labels used for training and testing can have a significant effect
on classification accuracy. Through the study of some 27 ground truth labeling schemes derived from
16 different antivirus (AV) vendors’ labels, the labeling schemes providing the highest classification
accuracy were identified.
Practical considerations
This study considered some of the practical considerations of the deployment of the described system,
including the effects of drift on detection accuracy. In a commercial deployment of this system, it is
expected that the models used for detection and classification would require periodic updates to be
pushed to clients from a centralized server. Figure 7.3 depicts the model update process. Feature
data, decisions, and malware samples collected at the client would be provided as feedback to the
server. The server would use this information to either update the models directly, or perform
additional analyses of the new malware samples. The updated models would be provided by the
server to the client.
Whereas AV software signature databases are typically updated multiple times each day, the
described system would require less frequent updates – on the order of weeks – to maintain its
high accuracy. The cost of updating the models used for detection comes from the processes of
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Figure 7.3: Model update feedback loop, showing how model updates are generated and
pushed to the clients using data collected from the clients
obtaining training data and learning the models. The former cost is low because the clients provide
feature data, malware samples, and classification results that can be used to inform the model
update process. This is advantageous because it does not require that new samples be executed
in a laboratory environment. The provided feature data and classification results can also be used
to guide additional analyses. Such analyses include the execution of the malware samples in a
laboratory environment to determine whether the set of monitored features requires any updates.
Such updates are expected to be rare, but may be necessary to accurately detect and classify new
malware families. The updated configuration information would be pushed to the clients along with
the updated models. The latter cost, that of learning the models, is low due to the chosen detection
and classification training algorithm, stochastic gradient descent (SGD). The SGD algorithm is an
efficient algorithm for training linear classifiers that performs well on large numbers of training
samples and on high-dimensional data. Furthermore, SGD supports the successive refinement of
models as additional training instances are added.
Finally, while this study focused on the detection and classification of malware processes, the
techniques, test procedures, and SCS were developed with thread, application, and host-level detec-
tion in mind. Although not presented in this thesis, the described techniques have demonstrated
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promising results at the host-level, and preliminary work at the thread-level exhibited comparable
detection performance. The advantage of performing detection at the thread level is the possible
identification of specific malicious threads that execute in the context of an otherwise benign process.
The advantage of performing detection at the application or host level is the possible identification of
malicious behaviors being performed by a collection of threads or processes, such as those performed
in a shadow attack.
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